This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-10-08 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| While the Amended Complaint does allege that petitioner was the registered owner of the subject properties in dispute, nothing in the said pleading or its annexes would show the basis of that assertion, either through statements/documents tracing the root of petitioner's title or copies of previous certificates of title registered in her name. Instead, the certificates of title covering the said properties that were attached to the Amended Complaint are in the name of Gran. At best, the attached copies of TCT Nos. N-5500 and N-4234 only mention petitioner as the representative of Gran at the time of the covered property's registration when she was a minor. Nothing in the pleading, however, indicates that the former had become any of the properties' owner. This leads to the logical conclusion that her right to the properties in question at least through the manner in which it was alleged in the Amended Complaint remains ostensibly unfounded. Indeed, while the facts alleged in the complaint are hypothetically admitted for purposes of the motion, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint as well as to inferences fairly deductible therefrom.[35] Verily, the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the complaint does not hypothetically admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice of to be not true, nor does the rule of hypothetical admission apply to legally impossible facts, or to facts inadmissible in evidence, or to facts that appear to be unfounded by record or document included in the pleadings.[36] | |||||
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2008-12-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| With no "particular injury" alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.[27] | |||||
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2008-03-24 |
TINGA, J, |
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| We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.[19] Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the | |||||
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2006-10-30 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Nonetheless, in view of the wide breadth of discretion granted in certiorari proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to prevent a substantial wrong,[15] we received the merits of the case. | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| To the mind of this Court, the twin elements of probable cause and malice are lacking in the case at bar to entitle petitioner to damages he now seeks out. For one, it is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same.[28] In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of respondents. For another, there are no factual allegations in the complaint that can support a finding that malice and bad faith motivated the respondents in filing the two informations against petitioner. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law. [29] From our reading of the complaint for damages arising from malicious prosecution and from the records of the case, we find no ultimate facts to buttress these conclusions of law. | |||||