This case has been cited 13 times or more.
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2011-08-22 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in its execution which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself or herself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[12] The elements of treachery are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.[13] | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| In People v. Galapin,[73] People v. Continente,[74] United States v. Lasada,[75] People v. Mobe,[76] People v. Irinea,[77] People v. Rillorta,[78] People v. Cagalingan,[79] People v. Villanueva,[80] People v. Magno,[81] People v. del Rosario,[82] People v. Yrat,[83] People v. Saul,[84] and People v. Tamayo,[85] the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,[86] the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,[87] the principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity. | |||||
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2008-10-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court pored over the records of the case and found that Bryan's candid and straightforward narration of the brutal act perpetrated by Arturo on the night of the incident indubitably deserves credence. It is unbelievable that a 19-year old young barrio boy would concoct a tale surrounding the atrocious killing of his grandmother, and would impute so grave a crime to someone he respected, had it not actually taken place. The defense cannot even come up with a decent imputation that Bryan was impelled by ill motive when he pointed at Arturo as the author of the carnage. This is so because there is no plausible reason why Bryan should testify against Arturo, if the latter has nothing to do with what had happened. This Court has consistently held that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves faith and credit.[24] Indeed, as a relative of the victim, Bryan's purpose would be to ensure that the real culprit is punished rather than put the blame on someone who is innocent of the crime.[25] So, also, the Court has repeatedly said that the testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict.[26] In the instant case, Bryan gave a clear and convincing narration of the crime, identifying Arturo as responsible thereof. His lone testimony as an eyewitness, therefore, is sufficient to support a conviction. | |||||
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2008-07-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Petitioners argue that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal for failure to post the complete amount of the bond. They assert that they cannot post an appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award rendered by the LA due to financial incapacity. They say that strict enforcement of the NLRC Rules of Procedure[9] that the appeal bond shall be equivalent to the monetary award is oppressive and would have the effect of depriving petitioners of their right to appeal.[10] | |||||
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2006-02-06 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The CA affirmed the trial court's findings on appeal, as well as its calibration of the testimony of the witnesses. Jurisprudence has it that the findings of facts of the trial court, which the CA affirmed on appeal, are conclusive on this Court unless it can be shown that cogent facts and circumstances of substance were misunderstood or misinterpreted which, if considered, would alter or reverse the outcome of the case.[91] Indeed, as aptly stated by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Creamer v. Bivert:[92] | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.[25] | |||||
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2004-03-09 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| We ruled in People v. Continente[23] that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.[24] | |||||
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2004-03-09 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| In People v. Pia,[30] we held that "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions.[31] To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the declarant.[32] | |||||
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2004-01-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed.[47] Absent that understanding, there is a denial of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed" of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation. | |||||
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2004-01-15 |
DAVIDE JR., CJ. |
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| Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary.[22] The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused's rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment,[23] the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.[24] | |||||
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2002-07-30 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the lawyer's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.[47] Atty. Guinalon further testified that he explained to appellants their constitutional rights and asked them if they understood those rights. He told them the possible consequences of their statements. He even advised them not to give any statement if they were in doubt and to | |||||
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2001-06-28 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Absent any evidence of any improper motive for Marino Atienza to testify falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and his testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credence.[30] Indeed, as a relative of the victim, Marino Atienza's purpose would be to ensure that the real culprit is punished rather than put the blame on someone who is innocent of the crime.[31] | |||||
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2000-11-15 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence.[25] This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and the conduct of the witnesses. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the rule by altering or reversing the evaluation of the court a quo. | |||||