This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2010-01-15 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The failure to file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is not a denial of due process.[40] The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.[41] | |||||
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2009-07-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.[54] The failure of a party's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[55] | |||||
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2007-08-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| It is long established by jurisprudence that the reglementary period is reckoned from the time the party's counsel receives notice of the decision, for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3, Rule 38.[12] Thus, while the failure of a party's counsel to notify him of an adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom constitutes inexcusable negligence, it is not a ground for relief from judgment.[13] | |||||
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2005-08-12 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, took effect about three years prior to the filing of their appeal on July 14, 2000. Verily, to grant their petition would be putting a premium on their counsel's ignorance or lack of knowledge of existing Rules. He should be reminded that it is his duty to keep abreast of legal developments and of prevailing laws, rules and legal principles.[7] Unfortunately, his negligence binds his clients, herein petitioners.[8] Consequently, we cannot grant their plea considering that the loss of their remedy was due to their own negligence.[9] | |||||
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2004-12-10 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| It may well be true that the order of dismissal was erroneous or was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the order of dismissal having attained finality must be given effect.[21] The doctrine of finality of judgment, which is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice, dictates that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final and executory at some definite date set by law.[22] | |||||
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2001-08-23 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Samoso vs. CA[15] elucidates that relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court (1964 Revision) is a remedy provided to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy.[16] | |||||
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2001-03-15 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| "He[20] shall serve all parties and counsels processes, notices of hearings, copies of decisions/orders issued by the Commission by mail or by personal service and immediately attach the returns thereof to the records." § 4 of Rule XII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC is entitled "Duties and Functions of the Executive Clerk/Deputy Executive Clerk" and enumerates the powers and duties of the Clerk/Deputy Executive Clerk of the NLRC. It does not prescribe the manner by which service of processes of the NLRC should be made. It is § 3, Rule 1 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides the rule for service of notices and resolutions of the commission. It states that for the purposes of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, award or order by the counsel of record of the party.[21] Thus, in UERM Employees Union-FFW vs. Minister of Labor and Employment,[22] this Court ruled that when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent.[23] Consequently, petitioner is considered to have received notice of the NLRC Resolution dated April 29, 1991 on May 8, 1991, the date when his representative and counsel, Attorney Battad, was served notice thereof and not on August 12, 1991 or the date when petitioner actually learned of the decision. Attorney Battad's declaration that his secretary received the resolution of the NLRC while he was out of town attending to his ailing father does not justify his failure to inform his client of the decision. Attorney Battad's father died on July 24, 1991 or more than two months after his secretary received the notice of the NLRC resolution on May 8, 1991.[24] This Court has consistently held that the failure of a party's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable.[25] Notice sent to counsel of record is binding on the client and is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.[26] We quote with approval the NLRC's ratiocination on this matter as follows:"Complainant offers in evidence the affidavit of counsel Patrick Battad who admits having received the resolution of the Commission of April 29, 1991 through the latter's law office on May 8, 1991. Counsel Battad further declares that the said resolution was received by her Secretary while the former was out of town and only returned on May 9, 1991; that Imelda Yecyec, the Secretary of counsel Battad, had not reported to office since May 9, 1991; and that counsel only learned of the resolution of the Commission after having received copy of the entry of judgment in this case. | |||||