This case has been cited 17 times or more.
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2015-08-17 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| More importantly, this Court cannot give special treatment to petitioner. In our past cases, this Court already held that the failure of the counsel to file the required position papers before the LA is not a ground to declare that petitioner had been deprived of due process; and is not a cause to conclude that the proceedings a quo had been null and void.[26] In Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg,[27] this Court thoroughly explained that: It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A departure from this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception would be, where the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due process of law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due process. Respondent was able to fully present and argue her case before the Labor Arbiter. She was accorded the opportunity to be heard. | |||||
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2014-03-17 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."[22] [Italicization supplied] | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
BRION, J. |
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| In the hierarchy observed in the dispensation of justice, rules of procedure can be disregarded in order to serve the ends of justice. This was explained by Justice Bernando P. Pardo, in Aguam v. Court of Appeals,[20] when he said - | |||||
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2010-04-23 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| We agree that the CA had the discretion to dismiss petitioners' appeal. The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[30] | |||||
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2009-10-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Hence, technicalities must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a game of technicalities. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage, of justice.[39] | |||||
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2009-03-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure of the appellant to file the appellants' brief on time. But, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory. Hence, the court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[11] | |||||
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2008-09-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It has been said time and again that the perfection of an appeal within the period fixed by the rules is mandatory and jurisdictional.[35] But it is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.[36] This Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits[37] and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.[38] | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.[20] In Aguam v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained: The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[21] Third, while we affirm that the subject lease agreement is a contract of adhesion, such a contract is not void per se. It is as binding as any ordinary contract. A party who enters into an adhesion contract is free to reject the stipulations entirely.[22] If the terms thereof are accepted without objection, then the contract serves as the law between the parties. | |||||
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2006-03-31 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant's brief on time.[10] However, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory.[11] It is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically.[12] The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.[13] The discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[14] | |||||
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2005-06-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Private respondents harp on the fact that the Court applied procedural rules liberally in favor of the petitioner which they consider an injustice. They, however, must realize that the Rules of Court itself calls for its liberal construction, with the view of promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[5] The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.[6] In numerous cases, the Court has allowed liberal construction of the Rules of Court with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals, when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[7] As the Court has expounded in Aguam vs. Court of Appeals:[8] | |||||
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2002-07-31 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.[21] Where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.[22] Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.[23] Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.[24] In Aguam v. CA, et al.,[25] the following ruling was made with regard to dismissal of appeals filed with the appellate court, viz: x x x. The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind | |||||
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2002-06-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Confronted with issues of this nature, this Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits[22] and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.[23] | |||||
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2002-06-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As consistently reiterated, the power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary[25] and not merely ministerial. With that affirmation comes the caution that such discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[26] | |||||
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2001-08-23 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this liberality.[20] Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.[21] | |||||
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2001-08-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case of Paz Reyes Aguam v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[21] this Court repeated what has been consistently adhered to in a litany of cases that with regard to the disposition of appeals filed with the appellate court: The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Law suits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis and italics ours; citations omitted) | |||||
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2001-02-06 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| ...where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.[30] xxx Given the foregoing, it seems improper to nullify Young's motion on a mere technicality. Petitioner's averments should be given scant consideration to give way to the more substantial matter of equitably determining the rights and obligations of the parties. It need not be emphasized that rules of procedure must be interpreted in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice.[31] (emphasis and italics supplied) In short, since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.[32] Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.[33] It was thus towards this sacrosanct goal that this Court in the recent case of Paz Reyes Aguam v. CA, et al.[34] held:. . .The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice[35] "A litigation is not a game of technicalities."[36] "Law suits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts."[37] Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality.[38] Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.[39]. . the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice.[40] It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. (emphasis and italics ours) Second, while there is no dispute that mere inadequacy of the price per se will not set aside a judicial sale of real property, nevertheless, where the inadequacy of the price is purely shocking to the conscience,[41] such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly or indirectly be likely to consent to it,[42] the same will be set aside.[43] Thus, in one case,[44] the judicial sale of land worth P60,000.00 for P867.00 was considered shocking to the conscience. So also, the sale of properties at around 10% of their values, as when a radio worth P1,000.00 was sold for P100.00 and a matrimonial bed costing P500.00 was sold for P50.00, the price was held to be grossly inadequate.[45] How much more the judicial sale of two (2) prime commercial lots located in Guadalupe, Makati, conservatively valued at P500,000.00 in 1987, to satisfy a money judgment of P57,396.85? | |||||