This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-07-30 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the petition for review before the CA was filed by TRANSCO.[39] AIC never elevated before the courts the matter concerning the discrepancy between the amount of the award stated in the body of the Final Award and the total award shown in its dispositive portion. The issue was touched upon by the CA only after AIC raised the same through its Comment (With Motion to Acknowledge Actual Amount of Award)[40] to TRANSCO's petition for review. The CA should not have modified the amount of the award to favor AIC because it is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does not appeal[41] and that a party who did not appeal the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.[42] The disposition, as stated in the fallo of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal's Final Award, should therefore stand.[43] | |||||
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2009-10-30 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In fact, we note that respondent has offered as evidence, Exh. "B", the same deed of pledge, as a further security to the loan agreement obtained by Marcopper from RCBC. With respondent's own admission in its pleading of the execution of the subject Deed of Pledge, it cannot now be allowed to contradict its statement and claim that the same document had been falsified without violating the rules on fair play and due process. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive as to him, and all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored.[16] Moreover, issues and arguments which are not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. If an issue is raised only in the motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, it is as if it was never raised in that court at all.[17] Respondent by its own previous admission is bound as to the due execution of the deed of pledge. | |||||
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2006-05-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In our Decision, we found that none of the parties questioned the validity of the stipulated interest rate. Finding the same legal, we upheld its validity. With the suspension of the Usury Law and the removal of interest ceiling, the parties are free to stipulate the interest to be imposed on monetary obligations. Absent any evidence of fraud, undue influence, or any vice of consent exercised by one party against the other, the interest rate agreed upon is binding upon them.[6] Nevertheless, we ruled that Paramount's liability therefor should commence from the date of judicial demand, or on 5 June 1990, and not from the date petitioner made a formal notice of demand to Paramount. This is but fair as the delay in the performance of Paramount is attributable to the failure of petitioner to inform the former of the developments in the negotiations with Roblett. | |||||
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2004-12-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| It is an elementary rule of contracts that the contracting parties are free to stipulate the terms of their contract for as long as the terms are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, public order, and national interests.[16] Laws in force at the time the contract was made generally govern its interpretation and application. The loan agreement between petitioner and respondents specifies the obligation of the debtor to pay interest. In principle said stipulation is binding between the parties.[17] | |||||