This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2015-08-19 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| On September 27, 1994, Mauricia donated Lot No. 557 to her children Rodrigo, Purificacion, Teofra and Estrellita. Thus, TCT No. 571 was cancelled, and re-issued as TCT Nos. 130517, 130518, 130519, 130520 and 130521 in the names of Mauricia's children.[1] | |||||
|
2007-09-05 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| That appellant had sexual intercourse with his daughter in 1994 was sufficiently proven. That he forced her into sexual congress in 1998 was likewise proven. The courts below correctly found that appellant had indeed employed threats and intimidation in order to subject AAA to his evil desires. Threats to kill her and her siblings who lived with a drunkard of a father under one roof coupled with his moral ascendancy and influence over her are sufficient factors to build a climate of psychological terror. It was observed in People v. Melivo,[41] that in incestuous rapes, "[t]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved malefactor to justice."[42] That ascendancy or influence flows from the father's parental authority over his children and from the latter's correlative duty of reverence and respect towards the former.[43] Although we have subsequently held that the moral ascendancy of the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not lead to the conclusion that sufficient intimidation was present,[44] it may be considered a contributing factor when coupled with other threatening circumstances such as those in this case. | |||||
|
2007-03-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| As for AAA's delay in reporting the rape, suffice it to state that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.[53] It must be remembered that appellant threatened AAA with harm in the event that she told anyone of what happened between them. The lingering fear instilled upon AAA is understandable considering that appellant lives only about one kilometer away from her. Also, he was called upon by her grandmother, BBB, to help in making copra. The possibility of him making good his threat is therefore not remote at all and the fear for her life remained palpable. Besides, this Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that people placed under the burden of emotional stress react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility; while some may openly welcome the intrusion.[54] There is no standard form of behavior when one is faced by a shocking incident. Under emotional stress, the human mind is not expected to follow a predictable path.[55] As we held in People v. Geromo[56] - | |||||
|
2006-11-29 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| Furthermore, being AAA's step-father, accused possessed moral ascendancy over her which should be considered a factor in her failure to struggle against him and to immediately report rape incidents. It was observed in People v. Melivo,[57] that, in incestuous rapes, "[t]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid. In a few cases, the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of courage to cry out for help and bring her depraved malefactor to justice."[58] That ascendancy or influence flows from the father's parental authority over his children and from the latter's correlative duty of reverence and respect towards the former.[59] Although we have subsequently held that the moral ascendancy of the accused in incestuous rapes, alone, does not lead to the conclusion that sufficient intimidation was present,[60] it may be considered a contributing factor when coupled with other threatening circumstances such as those in this case. | |||||
|
2005-04-15 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| The plaintiffs alleged therein that through the machination of Jae Il Aum, KEB granted a loan to the PHDI in the amount of US$500,000.00, with the condition that the said loan be deposited with the KEB in the name of PHDI. Thereafter, the plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage over their properties located in Lubao, Pampanga. As security for the said loan, PHDI deposited the said amount under its name with the KEB in two accounts, namely, Dollar Account No. 5311000486 and Peso Account No. 5311000487. Per Resolution No. 12-10-95 of the PHDI Board of Directors, the only authorized signatories to all applications for withdrawals from the said accounts were Jae Il Aum and Lourdes Mendoza. Jae Il Aum withdrew US$160,000.00 from the said account on February 15, 1996 by forging the signature of Lourdes Mendoza. He was again able to withdraw from the separate accounts, leaving US$163,000.00 as the balance thereof. It was further alleged that Jae Il Aum could not have withdrawn the said deposits without the connivance of the KEB. Moreover, the defendants' failure to heed demands for an accounting of the said withdrawals and for the restitution of the said amounts constituted large scale estafa for which they are liable for exemplary and moral damages.[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. G-3012 and raffled to Branch 49 of the court. | |||||
|
2003-04-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| We likewise affirm the trial court's award of moral damages to the victim in the amount of P100,000.00, or P50,000.00 for each of the two counts of statutory rape, in accordance with recent case law.[18] However, consistent with current jurisprudence which mandates that civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded upon the finding of rape, appellant must be ordered to pay the victim the amount of P100,000.00, or P50,000.00 for each count of rape.[19] | |||||
|
2003-04-01 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| Finally, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court should be reduced from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00, pursuant to controlling case law.[20] We note that the trial court did not award civil indemnity in favor of the victim. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape; it is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of rape.[21] Hence, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity must be awarded to complainant. The award of P200,000.00 as nominal damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages are without basis, and must be deleted. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime in this case, appellant cannot be ordered to pay exemplary damages.[22] | |||||
|
2003-01-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| All told, we are convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of the two crimes of rape imputed to him by complainant. However, the award of damages by the trial court needs modification. Only moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 was awarded by the trial court. It did not award civil indemnity in favor of the complainant. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of rape; it is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of rape.[12] Thus, complainant should be awarded another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. | |||||