This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2012-07-16 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Moreover, as correctly stated by the CA, dismissal of appeals on purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result to unfairness as in this case. In Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,[37] we cited reasons or justifications to resist the strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel's negligence without the participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. | |||||
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2008-04-30 |
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| In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.[14] The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his office. | |||||
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2006-02-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The foregoing factual findings in Borlongan v. The Office of the Ombudsman, bind the disposition of the factual issues in the instant case under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. For one, both the probable cause proceeding and the present administrative case require the same quantum of evidence, i.e., substantial evidence or that evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[20] For another, the factual backdrop in Borlongan v. The Office of the Ombudsman, which the Court declared as insufficient to hold respondents for trial, is the same set of facts that confronts the Court in the instant controversy. | |||||
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2006-01-31 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In the case at bar, we hold that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was no probable cause against the private respondents to hold them liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[11] The grounds for suspicion must be reasonable and supported by sufficiently strong circumstances.[12] As previously discussed, the Ombudsman correctly found that some of the essential elements of the offense charged are not present. Verily, we cannot attribute any arbitrariness or despotism to him. | |||||
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2005-12-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Petitioner contends that the failure of an appellant to file his brief within the prescribed time does not result in the automatic dismissal of the appeal since the appellate court has discretion to dismiss it or not. He suggests that procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice. He invokes the case of Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,[6] where the Court suspended the rules with the following to serve as guidelines: (1) the case involves life, liberty, honor or property; (2) counsel's negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the client caused the delay; (3) there are compelling circumstances; (4) there is merit in the case; (5) the cause is not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the Rules; (6) there is lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced. He argues that since there were compelling reasons for his delay, substantial rights and interests are at stake, and there could neither be any injury nor prejudice to appellees, the appellate court should have allowed his appeal. | |||||
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| This Court is not a trier of facts. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive,[19] as in the case at bar. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, suffices to hold one administratively liable.[20] The "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[21] | |||||
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2003-09-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| In this case, the Court finds compelling reasons to disregard the petitioners' procedural lapses in order to obviate a patent injustice. And to avert further delay, we have also opted to resolve the petition on its merits rather than remand the case to the appellate court, a remand not being necessary where, as in the instant case, the ends of justice would not be subserved thereby and we are in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before us.[25] | |||||
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2003-08-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The pleadings and documents filed extensively discussed the issues raised by the parties. Such being the case, there is sufficient basis to resolve the instant controversy.[20] Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the least attention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process.[21] Remanding the case to the Court of Appeals will only frustrate speedy justice and, in any event, would be a futile exercise, as in all probability the case would end up with this Court.[22] We shall thus rule on the substantial claims of the parties. | |||||