This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2011-07-27 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant, we uphold the trial court's ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[63] To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.[64] The accused-appellant has duly established in this case that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before he was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this circumstance of voluntary surrender during trial. | |||||
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2008-09-16 |
BRION, J. |
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| Voluntary surrender, properly undertaken, is a mitigating circumstance that lowers the imposable penalty. It is present when the following elements concur: a) the offender has not been actually arrested; b) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and c) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense attendant to the efforts of searching for and capturing him.[43] | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
TINGA, J. |
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| defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.[15] Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he had indeed acted in self-defense in stabbing Romeo. This issue involves a question of fact properly evaluated by the trial court.[16] Unless the records show that certain facts have been overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts.[17] After a thorough review of the records, we do not find any justification to modify the lower court's findings. | |||||