This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-08-03 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Incidentally, under Section 4, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.[54] As explained by this Court in People v. Abulon:[55] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[72] Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty.[73] Considering the far-reaching consequences of criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to support the attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.[74] Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous actions is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.[75] | |||||
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2006-10-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Moreover, the evidence showing that seven members of the PBAC did not attend the public bidding does not prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Tomas as acting Secretary and the other three members, that is, the deceased Benito A. Rillo, and herein petitioners Bernardino and Barawid, did not convene on December 8, 1997. Otherwise, stated, the absence of the seven PBAC members did not eliminate the possibility that the rest of the members convened and carried out the public bidding with four participating bidders. Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof, which in this case is the prosecution, loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.[32] | |||||
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2005-02-04 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.[25] | |||||
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2003-09-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The evidence of the prosecution on the matter of conspiracy falls short of [the] requirement. The evidence mainly point to the act of stabbing the deceased and what occurred thereafter. Whatever the prosecution witnesses testified to before the stabbing would be of little or no value as they themselves admitted that minutes before the commotion, they were watching a betamax and their attention was focused on the screen. As the stabbing happened, by the prosecution's own version, outside the fence, or on the road outside the house of Nanding Tomas, it is possible that they only saw that part when Viernes stabbed the deceased while the three (3) co-accused were holding him (the deceased). This picture does not of itself demonstrate a concurrence of will or unity of purpose and action. The mere holding of the deceased's hand does not necessarily prove intention to kill, because it may be that they (co-accused) were trying to prevent the stabbing of the deceased when the prosecution witnesses saw them. Absent any act or circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the crime, the theory of conspiracy remains a speculation, not a fact.[28] The testimony of the mother of the deceased that she overheard the group of appellants talking about shooting somebody is of little probative value. The prosecution failed to prove that the group was indeed planning the commission of the crime and that they were intending the plan for the deceased. Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.[29] | |||||