This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2006-10-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In the instant case, petitioner argues that since the filing of the criminal cases was anchored on the alleged conspiracy among accused public officials, including the corporate officers, regarding the anomalous and illegal transfer of four TCCs from Devmark to petitioner and the latter's subsequent use of three TCCs in paying their customs duties and taxes to the detriment of the government, the civil case regarding collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, being the civil aspect of the criminal cases. To buttress its assertion, petitioner quoted the last paragraph of Section 4, Republic Act No. 8249, which states that: Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: x x x. It is a truism beyond doubt that the jurisdiction of the court over a subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by law.[14] In addition, it is settled that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[15] | |||||
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2005-08-25 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.[43] It is elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the requirement that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied.[44] | |||||
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2005-02-23 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga in accordance with the above provision. After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan preventively suspending him from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5] Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must not only show that respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in issuing the questioned Order, "acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," but that "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[6] We have held that the "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order or Resolution.[7] Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.[8] To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.[9] This, petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly held that petitioner should have first interposed a motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order issued by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan. | |||||