This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2013-11-27 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is "one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title."[67] Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be "[o]n one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia legis non excusat."[68] He thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.[69] | |||||
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2009-07-09 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the matter of material dates, the petition for certiorari failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. It is settled that the following material dates must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: first, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received.[19] In the case before us, petitioner failed to indicate the first and second dates, particularly the date of receipt of the NLRC resolution and the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration.[20] As explicitly stated in Rule 65, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[21] | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
BRION, J. |
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| Largely for the same reason and as discussed below, we are not inclined to suspend the rules to come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has blundered by reading the wrong applicable provision. The Rules of Court are with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice; litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for the liberal construction of these rules.[12] Our ruling in Lapid v. Laurea[13] succinctly emphasized this point when we said:Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and, thus, effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. [Emphasis supplied.] | |||||
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2009-06-26 |
BRION, J. |
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| Under these clear and unambiguous terms, the PBA should have appealed the ruling of respondent Gaite of the OP to the CA within 15 days from notice,[6] and its failure to comply with the prescribed process is a ground for the dismissal of the petition.[7] Rule 65 - the legal basis for the present petition - itself bars its use as a mode of review when an appeal or any other remedy at law is available.[8] While jurisprudence has recognized exceptions to this rule, the exceptions - like any other exception - must be strictly, rather than liberally, applied. [9] In other words, a petitioner wrongly filing a Rule 65 petition must show a clear entitlement to the jurisprudentially-recognized exceptions. These exceptions are: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the interests of substantial justice so require; and when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[10] In applying these exceptions, the words of this Court in Lapid v. Laurea[11] are worth repeating and remembering:Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. [Emphasis supplied.] | |||||
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2005-02-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Section 3[20] of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and, (c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. This requirement is for the purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and executory.[21] | |||||
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2004-04-14 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Furthermore, it was held in Rabanal v. Tugade[10] that an attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Implicit with this directive is the command that all lawyers are duty-bound to keep abreast of the law and legal developments as well as to participate in continuing legal education programs.[11] All law practitioners should be fully conversant of the requirements for the filing of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[12] Ignorantia legis non excusat.[13] Ignorance encompasses not only substantive but also procedural laws.[14] | |||||