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AMPARO ROXAS v. CA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 164789 2009-08-27	CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY v. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO AND PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO BRION, J.
The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction. As we said in Roxas v. Court of Appeals: [18]
	GR No. 180394 2008-09-29	MARJORIE B. CADIMAS v. MARITES CARRION TINGA, J.
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as worded, where the HLURB's jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," the logical complainants would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors), and not vice versa.[20]
	GR No. 180394 2008-09-29	MARJORIE B. CADIMAS v. MARITES CARRION TINGA, J.
Not every controversy involving a subdivision or condominium unit falls under the competence of the HLURB[29] in the same way that the mere allegation of relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344.[30] Notably, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for cancellation of the contract to sell of a subdivision house and lot because the case did not fall under any of the cases mentioned in Section 1, P.D. No. 1344. In interpreting said provision, the Court explained, thus:On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
	GR NO. 158328 2007-02-23	FRANCO ESGUERRA v. ALFONSO MANANTAN QUISUMBING, J.
Moreover, petitioner never raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in his pleadings before the RTC. It was only in the Court of Appeals where he asserted for the first time that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment case. This Court therefore cannot countenance petitioner's adopting inconsistent postures by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular courts to which he had voluntarily submitted. Estoppel bars him from doing so.[12]
	GR NO. 142882 2006-05-02	SPS. RICARDO AND LYDIA LLOBRERA v. JOSEFINA V. FERNANDEZ GARCIA, J.
From the absence of proof of any contractual basis for petitioners' possession of the subject premises, the only legal implication is that their possession thereof is by mere tolerance. In Roxas vs. Court of Appeals,[4] we ruled:A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
	GR No. 151298 2004-11-17	SPS. MINIANO AND LETA DELA CRUZ v. CA AND SPS. ARCHIMEDES AND MARLYN AGUILA QUISUMBING, J.
Note particularly pars. (b) and (c) as worded, where the HLURB's jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to par. (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," it would appear that the logical complainant would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors ), and not vice versa.[26]