This case has been cited 14 times or more.
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2015-08-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[18] The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,[19] and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.[20] | |||||
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2015-07-29 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, are not entitled to bail before conviction. A reading of the provision reveals that bail shall only be denied when the evidence of guilt for the offense punishable by reclusion perpetua is strong. Necessarily, in all other instances, bail must be granted before the conviction of the accused. The right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[16] Evidently, despite being charged with a non-bailable offense, an accused can still possibly acquire bail. | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution.[21] This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in cases of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[22] | |||||
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2008-11-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The Constitution[62] grants to the Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition. Although this original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition (together with petitions for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus) is concurrent with that of the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, the established policy is that this Court allows the direct invocation of its original jurisdiction "if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant,"[63] or "in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy."[64] This policy has been applied by the Court in exceptional cases, among them, People v. Cuaresma,[65] Santiago v. Vasquez,[66] Manalo v. Gloria,[67] Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr.,[68] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[69] Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[70] and Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.[71] | |||||
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2008-04-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We agree in the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioners' case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2) when public interest is involved; (3) in case of urgency;[17] or when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[18] As the Court of Appeals reasoned, the issue before the NLRC is both factual and legal at the same time, involving as it does the requirements of the property bond for the perfection of the appeal, as well as the finding that petitioners failed to perfect the same. Evidently, the burden is on petitioners seeking exception to the rule to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement.[19] Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners' own omission of the filing of the required motion for reconsideration.[20] | |||||
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2007-12-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| We are not persuaded by petitioners' posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside the point.[62] It is precisely the validity and enforceability of the deed of donation that is the determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property. Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed before Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In some instances, this Court even suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so demanded.[63] | |||||
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2007-01-24 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Petitioner contends that his failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's December 12, 2005 Order falls under one of the exceptions recognized by law. He cites the case of Government of the United States of America v. Purganan[19] where it was held that, although as a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it, said motion may be dispensed with under certain exceptions such as in case of urgency. | |||||
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2006-08-18 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| However, in Fortich v. Corona,[13] the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it.[14] Moreover, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the interests of justice so require. | |||||
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2006-02-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Thereafter, we directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail which, according to its November 28, 2001 Order,[3] shall be subject to whatever ruling that this Court may have in the similar case of Mark Jimenez entitled Government of the United States of America v. Purganan,[4] docketed as G.R No. 148571. In compliance with our directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest,[5] to wit:Accordingly, following the En Banc Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148571 dated September 24, 2002 to the effect that extraditees are not entitled to bail... while the extradition proceedings are pending...' (page 1, En Banc Decision in G.R. No. 148571), let a warrant of arrest issue against the herein respondents sans any bail, for implementation by the Sheriff or any member of any law enforcement agency in line with Section 19 of Presidential Decree No. 1069. | |||||
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2006-02-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Besides, even granting that prior notice and hearing are indeed required, respondents contend that petitioners had been effectively given prior notice and opportunity to be heard, because the trial court's order clearly stated that the matter of bail shall be subject to whatever ruling the Supreme Court may render in the similar extradition case of Government of the United States of America v. Purganan.[9] Petitioners did not contest the aforementioned order. Respondents declare that petitioners were likewise notified of this Court's directives to the trial court to resolve the matter of their bail. | |||||
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2005-10-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[14] Such exceptional and compelling circumstances were present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo[15] on the citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan[16] on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla[17] on a government contract on the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[18] on the status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona[19] on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area of a 144-hectare land. | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo[33] on citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan[34] on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla[35] on government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[36] on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona[37] on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area. | |||||
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2003-11-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, it was also held that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a condition sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[12] | |||||