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PEDRO G. SISTOZA v. ANIANO DESIERTO IN HIS CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN

This case has been cited 25 times or more.

	GR No. 187340 2013-08-14	ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ v. PEOPLE SERENO, C.J.
In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to private complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only be appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in whom the duty is primarily lodged.[29]
	GR No. 192591 2012-07-30	EFREN L. ALVAREZ v. PEOPLE VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In Sistoza v. Sandiganbayan,[17] Sistoza stood charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the same offense for which the petitioner herein was indicted and convicted. At the very first sight of lack of probable cause, the Court did not hesitate to spare Sistoza from being subjected to a trial, and in the process uttered the following wise words to caution against insensitive prosecution of supposed official wrongdoings in routine government procurement, stating: There is no question on the need to ferret out and expel public officers whose acts make bureaucracy synonymous with graft in the public eye, and to eliminate systems of government acquisition procedures which covertly ease corrupt practices. But the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who happens to have signed a piece of document or had a hand in implementing routine government procurement, nor does the solution fester in the indiscriminate use of the conspiracy theory which may sweep into jail even the most innocent ones. To say the least, this response is excessive and would simply engender catastrophic consequences since prosecution will likely not end with just one civil servant but must, logically, include like an unsteady streak of dominoes the department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors who, if the flawed reasoning were followed, are equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements they sanction.
	GR No. 192591 2012-07-30	EFREN L. ALVAREZ v. PEOPLE VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 required that the gross negligence must also be inexcusable. In other words, the gross negligence should have no excuse. But that was not so herein, for, according to Sistoza,[48] gross inexcusable negligence
	GR No. 155307 2011-06-06	M.A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES v. OMBUDSMAN VILLARAMA, JR., J.
As to petitioner's allegation that respondents DPWH officials and Teodoro Barrozo, by their inaction, were grossly negligent in their official duties, such assertion is bereft of merit. For an action to constitute as gross inexcusable negligence, it is essential to prove that the breach of duty borders on malice and is characterized by flagrant, palpable and willful indifference to consequences insofar as other person may be affected.[24] Here, public respondents had not acted maliciously and with utter and willful indifference or disregard of other persons affected. In fact, by respondent Cammayo's act of employing additional slope protection to prevent further landslides in the area, he could not be deemed to have acted with gross inexcusable negligence. In addition, the DPWH through its contractor installed polyurethane sheets for slope protection to the affected area in order to prevent further erosion. Soil nails consisting of steel bars and grouted cement motor was also installed. The project director immediately hired a structural design specialist to prepare plans for a new reinforced concrete retaining wall which will provide for permanent slope protection. Furthermore, as explained by respondents, the delay of the BGHMC administration in obtaining the permits was due to the need to submit documents from other offices which public respondents did not have control over. All these acts negate petitioner's assertion that respondents are guilty of gross inexcusable negligence in the construction of the BGHMC expansion project. Gross inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. Rather, it refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[25] Even if respondents failed to fully prevent the landslide which occurred at the construction site, they had exercised due diligence in order to forestall the occurrence of landslide on the area and to adjacent properties and hence, they cannot be deemed to have acted with gross inexcusable negligence.
	GR Nos. 159017-18 2011-03-09	PAULINO S. ASILO v. PEOPLE AND SPS. VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI PEREZ, J.
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[36] [It] contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[37]
	GR No. 188487 2011-02-14	VAN D. LUSPO v. PEOPLE NACHURA, J.
Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proferred to indicate that the accused had taken part in, x x x the "planning, preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government" for, otherwise, any "careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only) been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds" really responsible for that irregularity.[68]
	GR No. 177727 2010-01-19	HAROLD V. TAMARGO v. ROMULO AWINGAN CORONA, J.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court case.[39] When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation.[40] The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna.[41]
	GR No. 174168 2009-03-30	SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM TINGA, J.
As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions. Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[23]
	GR No. 162938 2007-12-27	ALFREDO C. BUYAGAO v. HADJI FAIZAL G. KARON QUISUMBING, J.
(4) the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[15]
	GR No. 140656 & 154482 2007-09-13	MAYOR FELIPE K. CONSTANTINO v. SANDIGANBAYAN TINGA, J.
Additionally, Section 3(e) poses the standard of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence before liability can be had under the provision. Manifest partiality is characterized by a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other.[36] Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[37] Gross inexcusable negligence is defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[38] Mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable.[39]
	GR NOS. 167006-07 2007-08-14	DANILO D. COLLANTES v. SIMEON MARCELO NACHURA, J.
There is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[24] When the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion.[25] The Court has consistently issued a writ of certiorari in any of the following instances: When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
	GR NO. 166797 2007-07-10	JOSE M. GALARIO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
This Court spelled out in Sistoza v. Desierto[28] the following elements of the offense falling under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019:(a) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
	GR NO. 159876 2007-06-26	DINO A. CRUCILLO v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN GARCIA, J.
In the instant case, there is no positive and direct evidence that the petitioners acted in conspiracy with other implicated individuals. It is sheer speculation to ascribe corrupt intent and conspiracy of wrongdoing on petitioner Tengco simply because he took part in the passage of the resolution approving the subject loan. Petitioner Crucillo, on the other hand, did not even have loan-approving authority. His role in the whole drama was to study/ evaluate the loan application, present arguments for and against its approval and propose terms and conditions since approval is the board's decision. As we have consistently held, evidence of guilt must be premised upon a more knowing, personal and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.[66] And if only to highlight the feebleness of the conspiracy angle, no less than Omb. Marcelo ordered the exclusion from the information in Criminal Case No. 26539 three (3) of the original ten (10) accused. Then, too, respondent PCGG saw fit to grant Mr. Benedicto immunity from criminal prosecution for acts committed in relation with the subject PAFICO loan.
	GR NO. 169251 2006-12-20	DEMIE L. URIARTE v. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.[68] "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[69] It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[70] "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[71]
	GR NO. 169251 2006-12-20	DEMIE L. URIARTE v. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.[68] "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[69] It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[70] "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[71]
	GR NOS. 169727-28 2006-08-18	BRIG. GEN. JOSE S. RAMISCAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause,[32] except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[33] Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion.[34] As we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),[35] a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances: When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
	GR NO. 166924 2006-08-17	GLAXOSMITHKLINE PHILIPPINES v. KHALID MEHMOOD MALIK GARCIA, J.
For sure, the Court is consistent in its view that the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor.[14]
	GR NO. 164664 2006-07-20	CARLOS C. FUENTES v. SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman's investigatory power, exercised through the Special Prosecutor, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[37] In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[38] Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion.[39] As we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),[40] a writ of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances: When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
	GR NO. 167048 2006-04-07	MARIETTA T. CAUGMA v. PEOPLE CALLEJO, SR., J.
That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[73] It must be stressed that mere bad faith is not enough for one to be liable under the law, since the act of bad faith must in the first place be evident.[74] Elaborating on the meaning of evident bad faith, this Court held in Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan:[75]
	GR NO. 152188 2005-08-08	FLORENTINO R.* BRUCAL v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO QUISUMBING, J.
Petitioner Brucal contends that he cannot be held liable for dishonesty emphasizing that he was signatory solely on the Statement of Time Elapsed, a document which pertains to the original contract time, date of effectivity of contract, contract amount, total calendar days elapsed to date, percentage of time elapsed, percentage of work accomplished and slippage.[27] It had nothing to do with the materials used in the project nor the manner of its construction in accordance with the approved plans and specifications as charged.[28] Petitioner Cruz, for his part, contends that he cannot be faulted for relying on Engr. Razo's certification that the materials used in the project had been tested and had passed all the requirements.[29] As enunciated in Sistoza v. Desierto[30] and Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[31] Cruz avers that as head of office, he can, to a reasonable extent rely on his subordinate.
	GR No. 152188 2005-07-08	FLORENTINO R.* BRUCAL v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO QUISUMBING, J.
Petitioner Brucal contends that he cannot be held liable for dishonesty emphasizing that he was signatory solely on the Statement of Time Elapsed, a document which pertains to the original contract time, date of effectivity of contract, contract amount, total calendar days elapsed to date, percentage of time elapsed, percentage of work accomplished and slippage.[27] It had nothing to do with the materials used in the project nor the manner of its construction in accordance with the approved plans and specifications as charged.[28] Petitioner Cruz, for his part, contends that he cannot be faulted for relying on Engr. Razo's certification that the materials used in the project had been tested and had passed all the requirements.[29] As enunciated in Sistoza v. Desierto[30] and Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[31] Cruz avers that as head of office, he can, to a reasonable extent rely on his subordinate.
	GR NO. 165751 2005-04-12	DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM v. SECOND DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution.[26]
	GR NO. 153578 2005-01-28	VICENTE C. JIMENEZ v. EULOGIO TOLENTINO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is past dispute of course that in every rule, there are always settled exceptions.[16] Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman.[17] In Cabahug v. People,[18] we expressed the rationale for the exception in this wise:While it is the function of the Ombudsman to determine whether or not the petitioner should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, he cannot do so arbitrarily. This seemingly exclusive and unilateral authority of the Ombudsman must be tempered by the Court when powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for persecution. Dismissing the case against the accused for palpable want of probable cause not only spares her the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, but also prevents needless waste of the court's time and saves the precious resources of the government.
	GR Nos. 157419-20 2004-12-13	LIBRADO M. CABRERA v. SIMEON V. MARCELO TINGA, J,
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause.[27] The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[28]