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SANTIAGO ALCANTARA v. CA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 168612 2014-12-10	PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION v. CA LEONEN, J.
Luzon Development Bank was decided in 1995 but remains "good law."[75] In the 2002 case of Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[76] this court rejected petitioner Santiago Alcantara, Jr.'s argument that the Rules of Court, specifically Rule 43, Section 2, superseded the Luzon Development Bank ruling: Petitioner argues, however, that Luzon Development Bank is no longer good law because of Section 2, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, a new provision introduced by the 1997 revision. The provision reads:
	GR No. 149050 2009-03-25	SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT - NUWHRAIN-APL v. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN TINGA, J.
Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14] and Nippon Paint Employees Union v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court reiterated the aforequoted ruling. In Alcantara, the Court held that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in Luzon Development Bank still stands. The Court explained, thus:The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far from being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902:
	GR No. 157775 2007-10-19	LEYTE IV ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. LEYECO IV EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
did not alter the Court's ruling in Luzon Development Bank. Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is nothing more than a reiteration of the exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA,[29] as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[30] as amended by Republic Act No. 7902:[31]
	GR No. 147572 2003-02-19	TEODORICO ROSARIO v. VICTORY RICEMILL CALLEJO, SR., J.
Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude;" and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.[13]