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PEOPLE v. ANTONIO ROQUE

This case has been cited 8 times or more.

2004-05-27
QUISUMBING, J.
It is true that the prosecution's evidence did not establish the exact dates of the commission of the rapes for which the appellant stands accused. All that it could show is that the appellant raped the offended party in November 1998. Nonetheless, the date of the incident is not an essential element of the offense of rape and the proof need not correspond exactly to the allegation in the information as long as the offense was committed within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.[36] In the face of the positive identification made by the complainant of the appellant as her ravisher, appellant's defense simply crumbles. When the evidence convincingly connects the crime and culprit, the probative value of denial and alibi is negligible.[37]
2003-05-05
BELLOSILLO, J.
We disagree.  Section 11, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, provides Sec. 11. Time of Commission of the Offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at anytime as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. In explaining the provision, we said that the time averred in the complaint or information would only need, unless the precise time of commission of the offense is an essential element thereof, to meet two (2) criteria: (a) it is as near to the actual date of commission of the offense as the complaint or information of the prosecuting officer will permit; and, (b) the time ultimately proved should be as so alleged in the complaint or information.[31]
2003-05-05
BELLOSILLO, J.
Thus, in prosecutions for rape, we have sustained complaints and informations which merely alleged: "sometime before and until October 15, 1994," for a rape committed in 1993;[34] "on or about May 1998," for a rape committed sometime in the first week of May 1998;[35] "on or about May 1994," for a rape committed on 11 May 1994;[36] "sometime in 1992 and subsequent thereto in 1994," for two counts of rape committed in August and September 1994;[37] "sometime in the month of April 1993," for a rape committed sometime in 1993;[38] "sometime in the month of September 1998," for a rape committed one night in September 1998;[39] "sometime (in) January 1992, and many times thereafter," for a rape committed during the first week of January 1992;[40] and "on or about the year 1990," for a rape committed in 1990.[41]
2003-05-05
BELLOSILLO, J.
Art. 47.  In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of Death Penalty Cases. The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy (70) years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty shall be reclusion perpetua Hence, there may be circumstances to warrant such forbearance.  Thus, in People v. Roque,[51] where this Court upheld the conviction of  the accused for two (2) counts of rape committed, first in the month of August 1994, and second, in the month of September 1994, under two (2) similarly worded complaints alleging that the two (2) counts of rape were committed "sometime in 1992 and subsequent thereto in 1994," the death penalty imposed by the trial court was reduced to reclusion perpetua.  We opined then that
2003-05-05
BELLOSILLO, J.
When Rowena reached the Barangay Hall that evening she was met by Barangay Tanod Victorino Betinol who was on duty. Rowena was crying.  She had bruises on her chin and shoulders.  Her aunt Rebecca kept Rowena company as she reported to Betinol that she was mauled by her father.  Thereafter, Betinol, together with six (6) other Tanods, accompanied Rowena back to their house where Betinol asked accused Solomon Purazo if he mauled his daughter Rowena. After admitting that he did so, upon invitation of the Barangay Tanods, the accused went with them to the Barangay Hall.[11]
2003-01-14
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
We pointed out in the Echegaray case that the imposition of the death penalty in those cases where the law provides for a penalty ranging from reclusion perpetua to death does not give the trial court an unfettered but, rather, a guided discretion in the imposition of capital punishment. Particularly enlightening on how such discretion is to be exercised is the recent case of People v. Antonio Roque,[37] where the accused was likewise sentenced by the trial court to death for raping his two daughters aged nine and eleven. In the said case, we reduced the penalties from death to reclusion perpetua, to wit: