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RURAL BANK OF MILAOR v. FRANCISCA OCFEMIA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 181426 2015-07-13	GAMES v. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A bank is liable to innocent third persons where representation is made in the course of its normal business by an agent like Mercado as Branch Manager, even though such agent is abusing his authority. Clearly, persons dealing with Mercado could not be blamed for believing that he was authorized to transact business for and on behalf of the bank.[49]
	GR No. 183573 2012-07-18	DIZON COPPER SILVER MINES v. DR. LUIS D. DIZON PEREZ, J.
For review[1] are the Decision[2] dated 9 May 2008 and Resolution[3] dated 1 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99947. In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared as void ad initio petitioner's applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) but held as valid a similar application of the respondent. The decision was a reversal of the ruling[4] of the Office of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 06-C-113 and a reinstatement of the previous orders[5] issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court accordingly reads:[6]
	GR No. 170352 2011-06-01	MEGAN SUGAR CORPORATION v. RTC OF ILOILO PERALTA, J.
MEGAN can no longer deny the authority of Atty. Sabig as they have already clothed him with apparent authority to act in their behalf. It must be remembered that when Atty. Sabig entered his appearance, he was accompanied by Concha, MEGAN's director and general manager. Concha himself attended several court hearings, and on December 17, 2002, even sent a letter[28] to the RTC asking for the status of the case. A corporation may be held in estoppel from denying as against innocent third persons the authority of its officers or agents who have been clothed by it with ostensible or apparent authority.[29]Atty. Sabig may not have been armed with a board resolution, but the appearance of Concha made the parties assume that MEGAN had knowledge of Atty. Sabig's actions and, thus, clothed Atty. Sabig with apparent authority such that the parties were made to believe that the proper person and entity to address was Atty. Sabig. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists.[30]
	GR No. 163825 2010-07-13	VIOLETA TUDTUD BANATE v. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK BRION, J.
In the present case, the decision of the trial court was utterly silent on the manner by which PCRB, as supposed principal, has "clothed" or "held out" its branch manager as having the power to enter into an agreement, as claimed by petitioners. No proof of the course of business, usages and practices of the bank about, or knowledge that the board had or is presumed to have of, its responsible officers' acts regarding bank branch affairs, was ever adduced to establish the branch manager's apparent authority to verbally alter the terms of mortgage contracts.[23] Neither was there any allegation, much less proof, that PCRB ratified Mondigo's act or is estopped to make a contrary claim.[24]
	GR NO. 150350 2006-08-22	KOJI YASUMA v. HEIRS OF CECILIO S. DE VILLA CORONA, J.
The corporation can also act through its corporate officers who may be authorized either expressly by the by-laws or board resolutions or impliedly such as by general practice or policy or as are implied from express powers.[10] The general principles of agency govern the relation between the corporation and its officers or agents.[11] When authorized, their acts can bind the corporation. Conversely, when unauthorized, their acts cannot bind it.
	GR No. 160215 2004-11-10	HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Administrator had no authority to bind NIA, the latter is already estopped after repeatedly representing to Hydro that the Administrator had such authority. A corporation may be held in estoppel from denying as against third persons the authority of its officers or agents who have been clothed by it with ostensible or apparent authority.[34] Indeed