Lawyerly

GR No. 181892

2015-09-08

BRION, J.

With respect to the amount of interest on just compensation, we decisively ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals[342] that the just compensation due to the property owner is effectively a forbearance of money, and not indemnity for damages.[343] Citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[344] we awarded a legal interest of 12% per annum on just compensation. The Court upheld the imposition of the 12% interest rate in just compensation cases, as ruled in Republic, in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[345] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[346] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[347] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[348] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[349] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[350] The Court reiterated the Republic ruling in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[351] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera,[352] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Goduco,[353] and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr.[354]

GR No. 192100

2014-03-12

REPUBLIC v. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that --

GR No. 176692

2012-06-27

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. VERONICA ATEGA NABLE

BERSAMIN, J.

The CA correctly prescribed 12% interest per annum on the unpaid balance of P31,034,819.00 reckoned from the taking of the land in 1993 until full payment of the balance. This accords with our consistent rulings on the matter of interest in the expropriation of private property for a public purpose.[38] The following justification for that rate of interest rendered in Republic v. Reyes[39] is now worthy of reiteration, viz: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

GR No. 188995

2011-08-24

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. JOSE PULIDO

BERSAMIN, J.

The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the State to take private property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public purpose, which, here, is already settled. What remains to be determined is the just compensation. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank,[19] the Court has held that compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.[20]

GR No. 164195

2010-10-12

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES

BRION, J.

We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case that: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]

GR No. 164195

2009-12-04

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA

BERSAMIN, J.

The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the State's power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[13] Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.[14]

GR No. 166518

2009-06-16

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO

PUNO, J.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the abovequoted doctrine is not applicable to the instant case for the simple reason that respondents herein do not ask for interest as part of the judgment in an expropriation case, but for interest which is imposed due to the delay in the payment of a money judgment. As stated above, the former is imposed in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred, while the latter is considered as legal interest, to be computed at 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,[15] because the interim period is deemed to be equivalent to a forebearance of credit.[16] Consequently, the award of the former needs to be stated in the judgment, while the award of the latter need not.[17] Moreover, the former is computed from the date of possession or filing of the complaint for expropriation,[18] the latter is merely computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory.[19] Therefore, we find no patent error in the imposition of interest on petitioner.

GR NO. 158563

2006-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.[35]

GR NO. 148574

2005-10-11

EUGENIO G. PALILEO v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation.[20] In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court characterized the power of eminent domain in this wise:The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.

GR NO. 148574

2005-10-11

EUGENIO G. PALILEO v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

As for the access road which was built in 1983, P.D. No. 552 provides that claims for compensation and damages ought to be taken within five years from the time it was built in 1983, or on or before 1988. As earlier noted, petitioners first instituted this proceeding for payment against respondent only in 1995. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein respondent would militate against them consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern.[32]

GR No. 158563

2005-06-30

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.[35] The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."[36] This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the

GR NO. 161656

2005-06-29

REPUBLIC v. VICENTE G. LIM

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain[19] or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon;[20] or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.[21]

GR No. 147511

2003-01-20

MARINA Z. REYES v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

PUNO, J.

In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[13] the Court ruled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots. Thus:"Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled

GR No. 147511

2003-01-20

MARINA Z. REYES v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

PUNO, J.

With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable from respondent NHA, the lower courts erred in not awarding interest computed from the time the property is actually taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited in court. In Republic, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court imposed interest at 12% per annum in order to help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time, thus:"The constitutional limitation of 'just compensation' is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

	GR No. 181892 2015-09-08	REPUBLIC v. JESUS M. MUPAS BRION, J.
With respect to the amount of interest on just compensation, we decisively ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals[342] that the just compensation due to the property owner is effectively a forbearance of money, and not indemnity for damages.[343] Citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[344] we awarded a legal interest of 12% per annum on just compensation. The Court upheld the imposition of the 12% interest rate in just compensation cases, as ruled in Republic, in Reyes v. National Housing Authority,[345] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[346] Republic v. Court of Appeals,[347] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Imperial,[348] Philippine Ports Authority v. Rosales-Bondoc,[349] and Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority.[350] The Court reiterated the Republic ruling in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[351] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera,[352] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Goduco,[353] and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr.[354]
	GR No. 192100 2014-03-12	REPUBLIC v. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that --
	GR No. 176692 2012-06-27	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. VERONICA ATEGA NABLE BERSAMIN, J.
The CA correctly prescribed 12% interest per annum on the unpaid balance of P31,034,819.00 reckoned from the taking of the land in 1993 until full payment of the balance. This accords with our consistent rulings on the matter of interest in the expropriation of private property for a public purpose.[38] The following justification for that rate of interest rendered in Republic v. Reyes[39] is now worthy of reiteration, viz: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
	GR No. 188995 2011-08-24	EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. JOSE PULIDO BERSAMIN, J.
The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations upon this inherent right of the State to take private property, namely: (a) that the taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) that just compensation must be paid to the owner. The State must first establish that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public purpose, which, here, is already settled. What remains to be determined is the just compensation. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank,[19] the Court has held that compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless there is prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.[20]
	GR No. 164195 2010-10-12	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES BRION, J.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals[14] the need for prompt payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case that: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.[15] [Emphasis supplied.]
	GR No. 164195 2009-12-04	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA BERSAMIN, J.
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the State's power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[13] Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.[14]
	GR No. 166518 2009-06-16	NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO PUNO, J.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the abovequoted doctrine is not applicable to the instant case for the simple reason that respondents herein do not ask for interest as part of the judgment in an expropriation case, but for interest which is imposed due to the delay in the payment of a money judgment. As stated above, the former is imposed in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred, while the latter is considered as legal interest, to be computed at 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,[15] because the interim period is deemed to be equivalent to a forebearance of credit.[16] Consequently, the award of the former needs to be stated in the judgment, while the award of the latter need not.[17] Moreover, the former is computed from the date of possession or filing of the complaint for expropriation,[18] the latter is merely computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory.[19] Therefore, we find no patent error in the imposition of interest on petitioner.
	GR NO. 158563 2006-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.[35]
	GR NO. 148574 2005-10-11	EUGENIO G. PALILEO v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation.[20] In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court characterized the power of eminent domain in this wise:The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
	GR NO. 148574 2005-10-11	EUGENIO G. PALILEO v. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As for the access road which was built in 1983, P.D. No. 552 provides that claims for compensation and damages ought to be taken within five years from the time it was built in 1983, or on or before 1988. As earlier noted, petitioners first instituted this proceeding for payment against respondent only in 1995. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein respondent would militate against them consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern.[32]
	GR No. 158563 2005-06-30	AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. APOLONIO GOPUCO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.[35] The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."[36] This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
	GR NO. 161656 2005-06-29	REPUBLIC v. VICENTE G. LIM SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent domain[19] or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon;[20] or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.[21]
	GR No. 147511 2003-01-20	MARINA Z. REYES v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY PUNO, J.
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[13] the Court ruled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots. Thus:"Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled
	GR No. 147511 2003-01-20	MARINA Z. REYES v. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY PUNO, J.
With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable from respondent NHA, the lower courts erred in not awarding interest computed from the time the property is actually taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited in court. In Republic, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court imposed interest at 12% per annum in order to help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time, thus:"The constitutional limitation of 'just compensation' is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

REPUBLIC v. CA