This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2014-01-15 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| This Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 27 September 2010 and the Resolution dated 11 March 2011 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 113095.[1] In the assailed Decision and Resolution, the CA upheld the Order of the National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC) First Division dismissing petitioner's appeal for allegedly failing to post an appeal bond as required by the Labor Code. Petitioner had instead filed a motion to release the cash bond it posted in another NLRC case which had been decided with finality in its favor with a view to applying the bond to the appealed case before the NLRC First Division. Hence, the Court is now asked to rule whether petitioner had complied with the appeal bond requirement. If it had, its appeal before the NLRC First Division should be reinstated. | |||||
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2012-03-06 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| On the other hand, the first paragraph of Section 15 provides for the reservation of title in the Government only for the purpose of ensuring payment of the purchase price, which means that the sale was subject only to the resolutory condition of non-payment, while the second paragraph states that the purchaser thereby acquires "the right of possession and purchase" by virtue of a certificate of sale "signed under the provisions [thereof]." The certificate of sale evidences the meeting of the minds between the Government and the applicant regarding the price, the specific parcel of friar land, and terms of payment. In Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals,[15]we explained that the non-payment of the full purchase price is the only recognized resolutory condition in the case of sale of friar lands. We have also held that it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land.[16] Where there is no certificate of sale issued, the purchaser does not acquire any right of possession and purchase, as implied from Section 15. By the mandatory language of Section 18, the absence of approval of the Secretary of Interior/Agriculture and Natural Resources in the lease or sale of friar land would invalidate the sale. These provisions read together indicate that the approval of the Secretary is required in both the certificate of sale and deed of conveyance, although the lack of signature of the Secretary in the latter may not defeat the rights of the applicant who had fully paid the purchase price. | |||||
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2009-04-24 |
TINGA, J. |
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| At best, respondent's evidence may prove only that Lot No. 7129 was patented to Sofia Lazo and her heirs and that the same was later sold to respondent. We are not here making a categorical ruling on the ownership of Lot No. 7129, since ownership of the property is not the issue in this case. However, respondent is emphatic in her claim that ownership of the property has already been transferred from the Government to Sofia Lazo and her heirs by virtue of the issuance of Sales Patent No. 43619 on 21 July 1938. Indeed, jurisprudence has consistently held that under Act No. 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to the purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. When the purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title, the title, at least in equity, retroacts to the time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale.[32] Furthermore, in the event of the death of the holder of the certificate of sale before the issuance of the deed of conveyance, the interest of | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they were only attached as annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before the Court of Appeals. More importantly, said letters/notes do not have probative value because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic writing of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits[34] of Armi and her sister, Corazon Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination.[35] Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and without probative value. | |||||
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2003-12-05 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Applying the provisions of said Section 15, this Court ruled in Director of Lands v. Rizal [33] that although the Government reserves the bare and naked title to the land, the purchaser is deemed to be the actual owner thereof even before the payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee. This principle has consistently been applied in subsequent cases.[34] | |||||