This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2016-01-13 |
SERENO, C.J. |
||||
| The purpose of registration is to notify persons other than the parties to the contract that a transaction concerning the property was entered into.[65] Ultimately, registration, because it provides constructive notice to the whole world, makes the certificate of title reliable, such that third persons dealing with registered land need only look at the certificate to determine the status of the property.[66] | |||||
|
2014-09-29 |
REYES, J. |
||||
| Section 51 of the Land Registration Act further states that "[e]very conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting registered land x x x, if registered x x x be notice to all persons from the time of such registering x x x." "The principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into."[22] Thus, it has been held that "registration in a public registry creates constructive notice to the whole world."[23] Moreover, "[a] person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property."[24] | |||||
|
2014-06-09 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial's testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness' oral testimony.[36] Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes' statement.[37] Verily then, what the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.[38] Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,[39] a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes' sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial. | |||||
|
2014-04-21 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands would be valid only between the parties thereto, third parties would also be affected by the registered deed or instrument on the theory of constructive notice once it was further registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e., the deed or instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the register book for unregistered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the realty was located. As ruled in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza:[36] | |||||
|
2011-06-08 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into."[64] There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property. | |||||
|
2011-04-04 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| The deed of sale may have been notarized and it is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein.[39] A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution,[40] and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption.[41] Nonetheless, given the highly questionable circumstances present in the case at bar such prima facie presumption was properly put in dispute. | |||||
|
2010-10-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Berris was able to establish that it was using its mark "D-10 80 WP" since June 20, 2002, even before it filed for its registration with the IPO on November 29, 2002, as shown by its DAU which was under oath and notarized, bearing the stamp of the Bureau of Trademarks of the IPO on April 25, 2003,[40] and which stated that it had an attachment as Annex "B" sales invoices and official receipts of goods bearing the mark. Indeed, the DAU, being a notarized document, especially when received in due course by the IPO, is evidence of the facts it stated and has the presumption of regularity, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Thus, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due execution lies on the party contesting it, and the rebutting evidence should be clear, strong, and convincing as to preclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.[41] What is more, the DAU is buttressed by the Certification dated April 21, 2006[42] issued by the Bureau of Trademarks that Berris' mark is still valid and existing. | |||||
|
2010-07-26 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure affect the partnership's juridical personality.[65] An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract.[66] The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons.[67] | |||||
|
2010-03-15 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
||||
| It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed therein.[38] A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution[39] and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption.[40] However, such clear and convincing evidence is present here. While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details of Manuel's Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Martha's are complete. The absence of Manuel's data supports his claim that he did not execute the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have Manuel's positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuel's true signature. | |||||