This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-06-11 |
BRION, J. |
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| This CA decision should not be confused with the RTC's interlocutory orders that had been disputed before the CA, which was correctly contested by Trajano through a petition for certiorari. In J.L. Bernardo Construction v. Court of Appeals,[50] we stated that a petition for certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order: (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. | |||||
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2011-06-15 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." [15] The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." [16] Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." [17] From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. [18] But this is not the case here. | |||||
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2010-06-22 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| In the context of petitions for certiorari like the one at bench, grave abuse of discretion is understood to be such capricious and whimsical exercise of jurisdiction as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[38] It is tantamount to an evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[39] As the Constitutional office tasked with the duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue, and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to the government or any of its subdivisions,[40] respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioner's utilization of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 in the computation of its employees' retirement benefits. | |||||
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2007-04-02 |
CORONA, J. |
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| We have said often enough that for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to lie by reason of grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all, in contemplation of law. The judgment must be rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.[15] | |||||
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2006-12-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As a general rule, an interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits, given that a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts. This Court, however, has also held that an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Court is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order when (1) the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and (2) the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[21] Thus, despite this Court's finding that PDIC, as the liquidator of RBBI, availed itself of the wrong remedy by filing an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the revised Rules of Court, We shall adopt a positive and pragmatic approach, and, instead of dismissing the instant Petition outright, it shall treat the same as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same Rules, in consideration of the crucial issues and substantial arguments already presented by the concerned parties before this Court.[22] | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The 25 August 1998 Order of the labor arbiter partakes the nature of an interlocutory order, or one which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.[29] An interlocutory order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the courts.[30] The 25 August 1998 Order merely terminated formal trial of the consolidated cases, declared that the motion for inspection will be dealt with in the resolution of the case, and ordered the submission of the parties' respective memoranda after which the case shall be submitted for resolution. It did not put an end to the issues of illegal lockout, ULP, and illegal dismissal. | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[8] Moreover, it is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment.[9] The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.[10] Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.[11] | |||||