This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2011-06-15 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, the basic evidentiary rule is to the effect that the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving the same [65] with such quantum of evidence required by law. In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings like those conducted before the NLRC, the standard of proof is substantial evidence which is understood to be more than just a scintilla or such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [66] Since it does not mean just any evidence in the record of the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting in basis, the test to be applied is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the relevant evidence in the record of a case, would accept the findings of fact as adequate. [67] Viewed in the light of Union's failure to prove the factual bases for the computation of the same, we find that the NLRC correctly affirmed Executive Labor Arbiter Violeta Ortiz-Bantug's exclusion of the following benefits from the order dated 27 October, 2005, to wit: (a) vacation leave salary rate differentials; (b) sick leave salary rate differentials; (c) dislocation allowance; (d) separation pay for voluntary resignation; and (e) separation pay salary rate differentials. [68] For want of substantial evidence to prove the same, the CA's Eighteenth Division also correctly brushed aside GMC's insistence on the deduction of the additional benefits it purportedly extended to its employees from 1 December 1991 to 30 November 1993. [69] | |||||
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2003-07-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Moreover, petitioner's violation of the terms of the compromise judgment gave rise to a new cause of action on the part of respondent, i.e., the right to enforce the terms thereof. When she failed to obtain this by mere motion filed with the trial court, she was constrained to institute the proper suit for ejectment. The filing of a separate case based on a cause of action that arises from the application or violation of a compromise agreement is not barred by res judicata in the first action.[24] | |||||