This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2008-11-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
| So too did the Court pronounce in Felix v. National Labor Relations Commission,[68] Gutierrez v. Singer Sewing Machine Company,[69] Associated Labor Unions-TUCP v. National Labor Relations Commission,[70] Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission,[71] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Tolentino,[72] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[73] Permex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[74] VH Manufacturing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[75] A' Prime Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[76] and St. Michael's Institute v. Santos.[77] | |||||
|
2006-08-15 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| The general rule is that, factual findings of the NLRC, particularly where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.[25] Such factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding when supported by substantial evidence, meaning, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[26] Thus, the Supreme Court will not uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC as when it finds insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings. The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred, or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing of record.[27] | |||||
|
2005-08-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| We, likewise, rule in favor of private respondent with respect to her entitlement to moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be recovered only where the dismissal of the employee was tainted by bad faith or fraud, or where it constituted an act oppressive to labor, and done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy while exemplary damages are recoverable only if the dismissal was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner.[19] These damages, however, are not intended to enrich private respondent such that, after deliberations, we find the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages sufficient to assuage the sufferings experienced by private respondent and by way of example or correction for the public good. | |||||
|
2004-12-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| This was granted by the Supreme Court in a Resolution[21] dated 11 July 2000. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration[22] of this Resolution was denied[23] on 10 October 2000. Finally, on 12 December 2000, the Court en banc reiterated[24] its earlier 11 July 2000 Resolution and ordered its immediate implementation. Pursuant thereto, Criminal Cases No. 2503 and No. 2573 were re-raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219 and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-99892 and Q-01-99893. Criminal Cases Nos. 2574 to 76 were re-raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 227, and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-100542 to 44. | |||||
|
2004-03-05 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| The Court reiterates the much-repeated rule that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, where there is absolute agreement with those of the NLRC, are accorded not only respect but even finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[20] | |||||
|
2003-08-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| As regards the award of unpaid salary, the NLRC was correct in holding that petitioner is not entitled to compensation from January 1, 1998 to January 19, 1998, because he was not able to prove that he rendered services during said period. In the same vein, there is no basis in awarding moral and exemplary damages, inasmuch as respondents were not shown to have acted in bad faith in initially refusing to award separation pay equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service. Respondents even offered to pay petitioner separation pay, albeit in an amount not acceptable to petitioner. Moral damages are recoverable only where the act complained of is tainted by bad faith or fraud, or where it is oppressive to labor, and done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded only if the act was done in a wanton, oppressive, or malevolent manner.[27] None of these circumstances exist in the present case. | |||||
|
2003-08-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| In the case at bar, what was withheld from petitioner was not only his salary, vacation and sick leave pay, and 13th month pay differential, but also his separation pay. Hence, pursuant to current jurisprudence, separation pay must be included in the basis for the computation of attorney's fees. Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of his total monetary award.[35] | |||||
|
2002-09-27 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
||||
| finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[7] In any event, we waded into the records of this case and found no compelling reason to disturb the unanimous findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. Indeed, petitioners' persistent refrain, ad nauseam, that private | |||||
|
2000-07-18 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
||||
| and (b) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and defend himself.[37] In fine, prior to the dismissal of an employee by an employer, the cause for termination must be duly proven and fall under those enumerated in Article 282. Of equal importance is that prior to the dismissal of an employee, the requirements of due process must be met, that is, the employee concerned must be given both due notice and the opportunity to be heard and present his side. | |||||