This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2002-12-09 |
CORONA, J. |
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| might make."[28] The essence of treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack on the victim, leaving him unable and unprepared to defend himself or to repel the attack.[29] To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or for retaliation and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.[30] In the case at bar, we find that the trial court properly appreciated the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. | |||||
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2001-12-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Be that as it may, the sad fact remains that for being at the wrong place at the wrong time, Corazon's life came to an abrupt end. On that fateful evening while she was chatting with a friend, her young life was cut short by a stray bullet fired from accused-appellant's gun. While it may not have been the intention of accused-appellant to shoot her, this fact will not exculpate him because, as we pointed out in People v. Hilario,[79] "The fact that accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment. According to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.[80] The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado, or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.[81] The accused performed voluntary acts. The purpose was to kill. Hence, notwithstanding the mistake in the identity of the victim, the accused is still criminally liable."[82] | |||||
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2001-11-15 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Accused-appellant also calls the Court's attention to the six-month delay in Avenido's report of the killing to the authorities. Avenido, however, adequately explained the delay. As he was a fugitive from justice at the time he witnessed Cabote kill Tero, he understandably wanted to avoid drawing attention to himself. Thus, two days after he was re-arrested on May 3, 1996, he revealed to the parents of the victim what he knew about their son's death. On May 6, 1996, he reported the killing incident to the police. Well-entrenched is the rule that delay in reporting what a witness knows about a crime does not render his testimony false or incredible for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to be involved in a criminal case.[9] In this case, aside from natural reticence, Avenido had more reason to be afraid of getting involved in a criminal case as he was hiding from the authorities. | |||||
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2001-09-14 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Moreover, a close perusal of the records confirms the correctness of the decision reached. For one, the argument that accused-appellant could not be at the locus criminis in the evening of 3 August 1994 as he was at home drinking with a friend is not persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense and is quite irreconcilable with the positive identification of the eyewitnesses to the crime.[12] For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was at a place far removed from the scene of the crime such that it was well-nigh impossible for him to have participated in the slaying.[13] In the case at bar, accused-appellant himself admitted that his house was barely a kilometer away from the locus criminis and the distance could be negotiated in a matter of minutes.[14] Verily, his defense that he was at home which was just one (1) kilometer away while Nestor and Danilo were being peppered with bullets, does not satisfactorily show that it was physically impossible for him to have participated in the shooting. | |||||
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2001-09-07 |
PUNO, J. |
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| We sustain the trial court's finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the crime. It exists when, at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[38] Macuibelle testified that appellant Abelinde clubbed the victim's carabao. Thereafter, he joined appellant Hermosa who was then at the main door of the victim's house. They acted in unison in dragging the victim from her house to the creek where they finally finished her off. Their conduct clearly showed their mutual intent to kill the victim. | |||||