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PEOPLE v. ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 206357 2014-11-25	PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT v. OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES VELASCO JR., J.
Following Our pronouncements in People v. Pacificador,[6] the rule is that "in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted." As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Big. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16, 1982.
	GR Nos. 169823-24 2013-09-11	HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN BERSAMIN, J.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador,[28] however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador.
	GR No. 139930 2012-06-26	REPUBLIC v. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO ABAD, J.
Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019 was only 10 years.[16] Since the acts complained of were committed before the enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.[17]
	GR No. 135715 2011-04-13	PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS v. ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN PEREZ, J.
Section 11[26] of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however, under the old Republic Act No. 3019, this prescriptive period was only ten (10) years. In People v. Pacificador,[27] the Court held that the longer prescriptive period of 15-years does not apply in crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on 16 March 1982, because, not being favorable to the accused, it cannot be given retroactive effect. Considering that the alleged crime was committed in 1976, and in line with the Court's ruling in Pacificador, the prescription period should be ten (10) years.
	GR NOS. 165510-33 2006-07-28	BENJAMIN T.ROMUALDEZ v. SIMEON V. MARCELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador[22] that:It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.[23]
	GR NOS. 165510-33 2006-07-28	BENJAMIN T.ROMUALDEZ v. SIMEON V. MARCELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals[11] that:In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in petitioner's subsequent prosecution. x x x.[12]