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VIRGINIA O. GOCHAN v. RICHARD G. YOUNG

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

2010-11-17
PEREZ, J.
In addition to being conferred by law,[37] it bears emphasizing that the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the case is determined by the allegations in the complaint[38] and the character of the relief sought,[39] irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted therein.[40] Moreover, pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799,[41] otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as SCCs[42] pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC promulgated on 21 November 2000.  Thus, Section 1(a), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) provides as follows: "SECTION 1. (a) Cases covered. -- These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases involving the following:
2010-04-12
PEREZ, J.
Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved,[19] there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts[20] by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[21] In addition to being conferred by law,[22] however, a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint[23] and the character of the relief sought,[24] irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted therein.[25] In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,[26] jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.[27]
2008-06-18
BRION, J.
We likewise said in Gochan v. Young: [23]
2007-09-03
GARCIA, J.
The respondents' claim that both petitioners have committed other acts, if any, prejudicial to the interests of the corporation, the school and the academic community of Chiang Kai Shek College in general, is still has to be proved at the trial on the merits of the main case or subjected, initially, to the tests of sufficiency and the various rigors of the Rules. These are matters appropriately litigated in a derivative suit.[27]
2006-12-06
VELASCO, JR., J.
This argument is likewise bereft of merit. Indeed, as aptly pointed out by respondents and as borne out by the antecedent facts, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not have acted otherwise. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.[40] The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,[41] not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.[42] Given that respondent Salenga's complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it, clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the defendant.
2006-07-31
CALLEJO, SR., J.
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.[37] The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals[38] (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.[39] In Gochan v. Young,[40] a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows:The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
2004-09-30
TINGA, J.
The nullity of the RMOA as a contract of sale emanates not only from lack of Esther's consent thereto but also from want of consideration and absence of respondent's signature thereon.  Such nullity cannot be obliterated by Esther's subsequent confirmation of the putative transaction as expressed in the Contract to Sell.  Under the law, a void contract cannot be ratified[18] and the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.[19] A void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone it cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.[20]
2004-01-13
TINGA, J,
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.  This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3[26] and Section 2, Rule 87[27] of the Rules of Court.  In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,[28] this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:The above-quoted rules,[29] while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased.  These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed.  But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.  In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
2001-09-10
PARDO, J.
However, the law is clear.[3] The Revised Rules of Court[4] allows the annotation of a notice of lis pendens in actions affecting the title or right of possession of real property,[5] or an interest in such real property.[6] We further declared that the rule of lis pendens applied to suits brought "to establish an equitable estate, interest, or right in specific real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it x x x."[7]