This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2016-01-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority when she issued Department Order No. 710. They argue that her issuance was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function that could be the subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition.[39] In their submissions, they point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[40] | |||||
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2001-01-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| For alibi to prosper as a defense, one must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but must also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis.[23] The requirements of time and place must be strictly met. In the present cases, both requisites are wanting. First, appellant offered nary a scintilla of proof to show that he was actually in Imus, Cavite on July 1, 1997 and September 15, 1997 when the rapes happened. As already stated, appellant cannot rely upon the testimony of Eva de Jesus on this score. A careful reading of her testimony in court would show that nowhere did Eva claim that she personally saw him much less accompanied him, in Cavite on both dates. All that she knew was that appellant was supposed to be a construction worker in Cavite, and this led her to believe that he was at the construction site on the days of the alleged offenses. | |||||
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2000-12-15 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[8] To establish conspiracy, all that is required is that the conspirators had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[9] Although it appears that it was appellant's co-accused who dealt Roy the death blow, we agree that appellant performed real and effective acts to carry out the killing. When appellant blocked and held the victim's pedicab, it deprived the latter of any means of escape, it also rendered the victim vulnerable to the sudden attack from behind by appellant's unknown confederate. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually killed the victim.[10] All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.[11] | |||||