This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-08-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Before an injunctive writ is issued, it is essential that the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of a right to be protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right. The onus probandi is on the movant to show that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of the movant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[35] | |||||
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2008-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Esguerra would also later on withdraw her application for preliminary injunction/TRO. At this point, the question of whether RTC-Branch 87 properly denied the said application, became moot and academic.[24] There is no more justiciable controversy insofar as the denial of the petition for preliminary injunction/TRO is concerned, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief in this regard to which Esguerra would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of her Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79075 by the appellate court.[25] Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved. Courts will not determine a moot question.[26] | |||||
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2005-12-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[13] The prayer in the instant petition is for the nullification of the Court of Appeals' Resolutions dated December 18, 2002, and April 8, 2003 which granted the preliminary injunction and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, respectively. With the appellate court's subsequent resolution of the petition for certiorari and its nullification of the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court, thus making permanent the appellate court's preliminary injunction, this petition has become moot and academic. In Kho v. Court of Appeals,[14] we held that the issuance of a final injunction renders any question on the preliminary injunctive order moot and academic although the decision granting a final injunction is pending appeal. Here, the appellate court's decision granting the final injunction was not even appealed. | |||||
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2005-06-29 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| That the works of the petitioner may be the proper subject of a patent does not entitle him to the issuance of a search warrant for violation of copyright laws. In Kho v. Court of Appeals[49] and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated,[50] the Court ruled that "these copyright and patent rights are completely distinct and separate from one another, and the protection afforded by one cannot be used interchangeably to cover items or works that exclusively pertain to the others." The Court expounded further, thus:Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable. | |||||
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2005-01-31 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (a) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) the act against which injunction is to be directed as a violation of such right.[38] A preliminary injunction order may be granted only when the application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.[39] A preliminary injunction is not proper when its purpose is to take the property out of the possession or control of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception of the case and whose legal title has not clearly been established.[40] | |||||
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2004-02-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We find for private respondent. Prefatorily, it bears stressing that petitioners' Motion to Dismiss was filed after an Answer had already been filed. This alone warranted an outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in contravention of the clear and explicit mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Under this section, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.[9] Here, petitioners filed their Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss almost two months after filing their Answer, in clear contravention of the aforecited rule. | |||||
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2003-08-15 |
CORONA, J. |
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| During the trial, the president of P D himself admitted that the light box was neither a literary not an artistic work but an "engineering or marketing invention."[10] Obviously, there appeared to be some confusion regarding what ought or ought not to be the proper subjects of copyrights, patents and trademarks. In the leading case of Kho vs. Court of Appeals,[11] we ruled that these three legal rights are completely distinct and separate from one another, and the protection afforded by one cannot be used interchangeably to cover items or works that exclusively pertain to the others:Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. In relation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise. Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentable inventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable. ON THE ISSUE OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT | |||||
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2002-07-05 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| decision in Kho v. Court of Appeals[18] where this Court ruled that by virtue of Sec. 1, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, objections of this kind are forfeited when not raised in the answer/comment earlier tended to a petition for special civil action of certiorari, is not controlling. The instant case is governed by the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure where a motion to dismiss is generally proscribed except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or failure to comply with conciliation proceedings[19] and where the only matters deemed waived for failure to assert in the answer are negative and affirmative defenses.[20] Clearly, petitioners were excused from filing a motion to question the absence of the certification and, concomitantly, their failure to include the objection in their answer did not result in the waiver thereof since the objection is neither a negative nor an | |||||