This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2004-06-29 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Neither is Mary Grace's credibility affected by her failure to recall the exact date of the commission of the offense. She could only remember "August 1997" as the last time he ravished her. Her inability to remember the complete date does not render her testimony incredible. We have consistently held that such lapse is a minor matter and can be expected when a witness is recounting the details of a painful, humiliating and horrifying experience. What is important is the fact of the commission of the crime[24] which, in this case, she was able to recount in a credible and convincing manner. In any event, date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman.[25] Thus, the precise date of the commission of the crime need not be alleged in the Information.[26] | |||||
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2003-09-10 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The Solicitor General, supporting the stand taken by the trial court, would invite a revisit of the Mauricio[16] rule; he urges:"We respectfully pray that this Honorable Court take a second look at its ruling in Mauricio and other cases retroactively applying Rule 110, Section 9. The rule prevailing before the effectivity of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure was that generic aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the information, may be appreciated if proven at the trial. Prosecutors and trial judges relied on this former rule. With all due respect, the retroactive application of the new rule is manifestly unfair to the prosecutors and trial judges who relied in utmost good faith on the old rule. | |||||
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2003-08-14 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We likewise reject the contention of the appellant that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime because, as the victim herself testified, she was always accompanied by members of her family. It is well-nigh impossible for her to be accompanied by some other person every single second of her life. Besides, it is a truism that lust has no regard for time and place.[23] Neither the crampness of the room, nor the presence of other people there, nor the high risk of being caught has been held sufficient and effective obstacles to deter the commission of rape.[24] Appellant's mere denial is insufficient proof that no rape was committed, especially in the light of the victim's straightforward testimony which was consistent on material points. We have held that mere denial, which is unsubstantiated and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence, is self-serving and has no weight in law.[25] | |||||
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2001-12-07 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The fact that the Information did not specify the precise date in October 1991 when the rape was committed does not render the same defective. The precise time of commission of rape is not an essential element.[17] Such allegation in the Information does not violate due process and is sufficient to sustain guilt.[18] Besides, considering the mental status of the victim and the tender age of her sister, they cannot be expected to recall and keep track of the date, particularly when they had apparently chosen not to recall that day. | |||||
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2001-11-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| This Court, however, cannot award exemplary damages since the aggravating circumstance of relationship was not stated in the two Informations, hence, there is no legal basis to award such.[15] | |||||
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2001-04-03 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Accordingly, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, not because of technicality but because of his basic right to due process as guaranteed by the Constitution.[23] Simple rape is punishable only with reclusion perpetua,[24] which is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.[25] In addition, though several rapes were proven during trial, only one conviction can prosper since only one rape is charged in the information;[26] namely, the one committed on May 27, 1996. | |||||