Lawyerly

GR No. 203372

2015-06-16

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT

CARPIO, J.

In reading these cited cases, it should be noted that their reference to the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII was tangential and pertained merely to the provision’s underlying rationale. Thus, while noting that this provision applies only to presidential appointments,[106] the Court nevertheless cited the prohibition because of the rationale behind it, i.e., to discourage losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes, as these losers thereby deprive the incoming administration of the opportunity to make their own appointments.[107]

GR No. 171736

2010-07-05

PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY

NACHURA, J.

Given these premises, it is obvious that the alleged obligation of petitioner already existed and was known to respondent at the time of the filing of his Answer with Counterclaim. He should have demanded payment of his commission and share in the proceeds of the sale in that Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, but he did not. He is, therefore, proscribed from incorporating the same and making such demand via a supplemental pleading. The supplemental pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the filing of the original pleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.[34] Supplemental pleadings must state transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.[35]

GR No. 167239

2010-05-05

HICOBLINO M. CATLY v. WILLIAM NAVARRO

PERALTA, J.

The issue of whether or not Atty. Catly's attorney's fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catly's motion for execution of the compromise Judgment filed with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition, also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. In De Rama v. Court of Appeals,[44] we held that issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

GR No. 176707

2010-02-17

ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE

CORONA, J.

There is no dispute that the approval of the CSC is a legal requirement to complete the appointment. Under settled jurisprudence, the appointee acquires a vested legal right to the position or office pursuant to this completed appointment.[39] Respondent's appointment was in fact already approved by the CSC with finality.

GR No. 176707

2010-02-17

ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE

CORONA, J.

Second, it is undisputed that respondent's appointment was not submitted to the CSC, not through her own fault but because of Human Resource Management Officer I Ma. Teresa U. Diaz's unjustified refusal to sign it on the feigned and fallacious ground that respondent's position description form had not been duly signed by School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales.[35] Indeed, the CSC even sanctioned Diaz for her failure to act in the required manner.[36] Similarly, the Ombudsman found both City Schools Division Superintendent Ma. Amy O. Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable and suspended them for three months for willfully withholding information from respondent on the status of her appointment.

GR No. 164886

2009-11-24

JOSE FELICIANO LOY v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT

DEL CASTILLO, J.

On this point, we agree with petitioners' contention that the first answer cannot be deemed to have been replaced by the subsequent answer filed by the new Union officers. Pleadings are amended in order to allege facts which occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends.[35] In the case at bar, the subsequent answer could neither validly amend the first answer nor result in the withdrawal of the latter. It is to be noted that the new Union officers, upon their election, moved for their intervention and substitution on the premise that they became the real party in interest since the defendants in the case have ceased to be the legal representatives of the Union. Certainly, their election as new officers is an occurrence which arose after the filing of the first answer. Hence, the purported amended answer should have been designated as a supplemental answer. A supplemental pleading states the transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.[36] A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand.[37] As such, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Aquino and Frisnedi did not result in the withdrawal of the Answer with Cross-Claim filed by the original defendants in this case, but was merely supplemented by the subsequent answer.

GR No. 181559

2009-10-02

LEAH M. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE

DEL CASTILLO, J.

Before us, petitioners maintain that CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid because the Commission is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level. Petitioners cite De Rama v. Court of Appeals[11] which held that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is only applicable to the President or Acting President. They claim that outgoing or defeated local appointing authorities are authorized to make appointments of qualified individuals until their last day in office, and that not all mass appointments are invalid. Finally, petitioners claim that because Dumaguete City had been granted authority to take "final action" on all appointments, the Commission did not have any authority to disapprove the appointments made by outgoing mayor Remollo.

GR No. 163443

2008-11-11

LIZA M. QUIROG v. GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

As the Court ruled in De Rama v. CA[33] :The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

GR No. 160846

2008-02-22

BENJAMIN B. GERONGA v. EDUARDO VARELA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the CA and CSC did not anymore look into the merits of the decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04 simply because he raised no issue or argument against it.[47] Understandably, the CA and CSC could not be faulted for doing so; they were merely adhering to a basic rule that in any proceeding, a party who fails to cite specific grounds or raise particular arguments is deemed to have waived them.[48]

GR NO. 128099

2006-12-20

FELIX CAMITAN v. CA

TINGA, J.

Resolution dated 18 June 1997 dismissing their petition[26] that they claimed that the Court of Appeals committed "grave error tantamount to lack of jurisdiction thereof when it declared annulled the contested Order x x x x for lack of material evidence to support that the said title was lost."[27] We have consistently held that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time.[28]

GR NO. 145470

2005-12-09

SPS. LUIS V. CRUZ AND AIDA CRUZ v. SPS. ALEJANDRO FERNANDO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Notably, petitioners never raised these arguments during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.[16] Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[17]

GR No. 127079

2004-05-07

AYALA LAND v. WILLIAM NAVARRO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The issue of whether or not Atty. Catly's attorney's fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catly's motion for execution of the compromise Judgment filed with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition, also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. In De Rama vs. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that "issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."

GR No. 127079

2004-05-07

AYALA LAND v. WILLIAM NAVARRO

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The issue of whether or not Atty. Catly's attorney's fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catly's motion for execution of the compromise Judgment filed with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition, also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. In De Rama vs. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that "issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."

GR No. 146397

2003-07-01

COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION v. NLRC

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[8] These exceptions are not present here.

GR No. 137815

2001-11-29

JUANITA T. SERING v. CA

PARDO, J.

A petition for review on certiorari[17] is limited to questions of law.[18] In such petitions, factual issues are not reviewable by the Supreme Court.[19] Only errors of law are reviewable by the Supreme Court on petitions for review.[20] The exceptions to this rule include instances, sans preclusion: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial courts; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[21]

	GR No. 203372 2015-06-16	ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT CARPIO, J.
In reading these cited cases, it should be noted that their reference to the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII was tangential and pertained merely to the provision’s underlying rationale. Thus, while noting that this provision applies only to presidential appointments,[106] the Court nevertheless cited the prohibition because of the rationale behind it, i.e., to discourage losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes, as these losers thereby deprive the incoming administration of the opportunity to make their own appointments.[107]
	GR No. 171736 2010-07-05	PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION v. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY NACHURA, J.
Given these premises, it is obvious that the alleged obligation of petitioner already existed and was known to respondent at the time of the filing of his Answer with Counterclaim. He should have demanded payment of his commission and share in the proceeds of the sale in that Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, but he did not. He is, therefore, proscribed from incorporating the same and making such demand via a supplemental pleading. The supplemental pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the filing of the original pleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.[34] Supplemental pleadings must state transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.[35]
	GR No. 167239 2010-05-05	HICOBLINO M. CATLY v. WILLIAM NAVARRO PERALTA, J.
The issue of whether or not Atty. Catly's attorney's fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catly's motion for execution of the compromise Judgment filed with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition, also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. In De Rama v. Court of Appeals,[44] we held that issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
	GR No. 176707 2010-02-17	ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE CORONA, J.
There is no dispute that the approval of the CSC is a legal requirement to complete the appointment. Under settled jurisprudence, the appointee acquires a vested legal right to the position or office pursuant to this completed appointment.[39] Respondent's appointment was in fact already approved by the CSC with finality.
	GR No. 176707 2010-02-17	ARLIN B. OBIASCA v. JEANE O. BASALLOTE CORONA, J.
Second, it is undisputed that respondent's appointment was not submitted to the CSC, not through her own fault but because of Human Resource Management Officer I Ma. Teresa U. Diaz's unjustified refusal to sign it on the feigned and fallacious ground that respondent's position description form had not been duly signed by School Principal Dr. Leticia B. Gonzales.[35] Indeed, the CSC even sanctioned Diaz for her failure to act in the required manner.[36] Similarly, the Ombudsman found both City Schools Division Superintendent Ma. Amy O. Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable and suspended them for three months for willfully withholding information from respondent on the status of her appointment.
	GR No. 164886 2009-11-24	JOSE FELICIANO LOY v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT DEL CASTILLO, J.
On this point, we agree with petitioners' contention that the first answer cannot be deemed to have been replaced by the subsequent answer filed by the new Union officers. Pleadings are amended in order to allege facts which occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends.[35] In the case at bar, the subsequent answer could neither validly amend the first answer nor result in the withdrawal of the latter. It is to be noted that the new Union officers, upon their election, moved for their intervention and substitution on the premise that they became the real party in interest since the defendants in the case have ceased to be the legal representatives of the Union. Certainly, their election as new officers is an occurrence which arose after the filing of the first answer. Hence, the purported amended answer should have been designated as a supplemental answer. A supplemental pleading states the transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.[36] A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand.[37] As such, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Aquino and Frisnedi did not result in the withdrawal of the Answer with Cross-Claim filed by the original defendants in this case, but was merely supplemented by the subsequent answer.
	GR No. 181559 2009-10-02	LEAH M. NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE DEL CASTILLO, J.
Before us, petitioners maintain that CSC Resolution No. 010988 is invalid because the Commission is without authority to issue regulations prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level. Petitioners cite De Rama v. Court of Appeals[11] which held that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is only applicable to the President or Acting President. They claim that outgoing or defeated local appointing authorities are authorized to make appointments of qualified individuals until their last day in office, and that not all mass appointments are invalid. Finally, petitioners claim that because Dumaguete City had been granted authority to take "final action" on all appointments, the Commission did not have any authority to disapprove the appointments made by outgoing mayor Remollo.
	GR No. 163443 2008-11-11	LIZA M. QUIROG v. GOVERNOR ERICO B. AUMENTADO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
As the Court ruled in De Rama v. CA[33] :The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that these were midnight appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
	GR No. 160846 2008-02-22	BENJAMIN B. GERONGA v. EDUARDO VARELA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the CA and CSC did not anymore look into the merits of the decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04 simply because he raised no issue or argument against it.[47] Understandably, the CA and CSC could not be faulted for doing so; they were merely adhering to a basic rule that in any proceeding, a party who fails to cite specific grounds or raise particular arguments is deemed to have waived them.[48]
	GR NO. 128099 2006-12-20	FELIX CAMITAN v. CA TINGA, J.
Resolution dated 18 June 1997 dismissing their petition[26] that they claimed that the Court of Appeals committed "grave error tantamount to lack of jurisdiction thereof when it declared annulled the contested Order x x x x for lack of material evidence to support that the said title was lost."[27] We have consistently held that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time.[28]
	GR NO. 145470 2005-12-09	SPS. LUIS V. CRUZ AND AIDA CRUZ v. SPS. ALEJANDRO FERNANDO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Notably, petitioners never raised these arguments during the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.[16] Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised for the first time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[17]
	GR No. 127079 2004-05-07	AYALA LAND v. WILLIAM NAVARRO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The issue of whether or not Atty. Catly's attorney's fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catly's motion for execution of the compromise Judgment filed with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition, also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. In De Rama vs. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that "issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."
	GR No. 127079 2004-05-07	AYALA LAND v. WILLIAM NAVARRO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The issue of whether or not Atty. Catly's attorney's fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catly's motion for execution of the compromise Judgment filed with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition, also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. In De Rama vs. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that "issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."
	GR No. 146397 2003-07-01	COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION v. NLRC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[8] These exceptions are not present here.
	GR No. 137815 2001-11-29	JUANITA T. SERING v. CA PARDO, J.
A petition for review on certiorari[17] is limited to questions of law.[18] In such petitions, factual issues are not reviewable by the Supreme Court.[19] Only errors of law are reviewable by the Supreme Court on petitions for review.[20] The exceptions to this rule include instances, sans preclusion: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial courts; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[21]

CONRADO L. DE RAMA v. CA