This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2003-12-10 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Considering that the rape was committed on November 18, 1999, the pertinent law is found in Article 266-B[30] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353 which took effect on October 22, 1997. Under said law, the death penalty shall be imposed when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity. Since this circumstance increases the range of the penalty and changes the nature of the crime, it is a special qualifying circumstance. Accordingly, consistent with appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, this circumstance must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial.[31] | |||||
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2003-09-30 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Appellant's argument that the delay in reporting the incidents renders the charges against him doubtful should also fail. Delay in reporting an incident if rape is not necessarily and indication that the charge is fabricated.[36] In these cases, the delay could be attributed to Marilou's tender age and appellant's threat to kill her and her mother if she would tell anyone what he did to her.[37] It is therefore, easy to see why Marilou kept her silence. Indeed, a rape victim's actions are oftentimes moved by fear rather than by reason. In incestuous rape, this fear is magnified because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the perpetrator or is at any rate subject to his dominance because of their blood relationship.[38] | |||||
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2002-04-05 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| To be sure, findings of the trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect in view of the fact that trial judge is in the best position to observe their demeanor while they are testifying during the trial.[25] We agree with the trial court that complainant's testimony is candid, spontaneous, and straightforward. It, therefore, deserves full faith and credence. It is clear, detailed, and consistent on all material points. What is more, it is corroborated on material points not only by the witnesses for the prosecution but also by the defense witnesses. For instance, accused-appellant's own niece, Manilyn Cruzin, confirmed that on July 1, 1997, at around 9:45 in the evening, complainant told her that she was molested by Rolando,[26] thus corroborating complainant's testimony that she told Manilyn and Vicky that she had been abused by accused-appellant. In fact, Manilyn said she told her Uncle Pedro what had happened as soon as he arrived. Although as a defense witness Manilyn claimed that complainant and accused-appellant were already lovers prior to the incident, the fact is that Manilyn did not question Marietta when the latter told her she had been raped by accused-appellant. Instead, she reported the matter right away to her uncle. This could only be because Manilyn believed what she had been told. | |||||
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2001-07-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The circumstances of minority and relationship mentioned in the aforecited provision are special qualifying circumstances that must be alleged in the information and duly proven by the prosecution in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. In this case, while accused-appellant admitted that Daisy is his wife's niece (and therefore a relative by affinity within the third civil degree), the prosecution did not present evidence, not even Daisy's birth certificate nor her testimony to prove her age. There is thus no sufficient evidence of her minority.[26] Hence, accused-appellant should be held liable only for simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. | |||||