This case has been cited 12 times or more.
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2009-10-02 |
BRION, J. |
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| For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and, (b) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. Any of the circumstances laid out in Article 1602, not the concurrence nor an overwhelming number of the enumerated circumstances, is sufficient to support the conclusion that a contract of sale is in fact an equitable mortgage.[11] In several cases, we have not hesitated to declare a purported contract of sale to be an equitable mortgage based solely on one of the enumerated circumstances under Article 1602.[12] This approach follows the rule that when doubt exists on the nature of the parties' transaction, the law favors the least transmission of property rights.[13] | |||||
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2009-09-14 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Going now to the question of whether respondent's members' individual acceptance of the award and the resulting payments made by petitioner operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary's award which renders CA-G.R. SP No. 72965 moot, we find that such do not operate as a ratification of the DOLE Secretary's award; nor a waiver of their right to receive further benefits, or what they may be entitled to under the law. The appellate court correctly ruled that the respondent's members were merely constrained to accept payment at the time. Christmas was then just around the corner, and the union members were in no position to resist the temptation to accept much-needed cash for use during the most auspicious occasion of the year. Time and again, we have held that necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.[19] | |||||
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2008-07-04 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In Lorbes v. Court of Appeals,[63] the Court held that:The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties. Sales with rights to repurchase, as defined by the Civil Code, are not favored. We will not construe instruments to be sales with a right to repurchase, with the stringent and onerous effects which follow, unless the terms of the document and the surrounding circumstances require it. Whenever, under the terms of the writing, any other construction can fairly and reasonably be made, such construction will be adopted and the contract will be construed as a mere loan unless the court can see that, if enforced according to its terms, it is not an unconscionable one.[64] | |||||
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2006-01-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| [19] Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 716, 725-726. | |||||
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2005-09-20 |
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| There is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. The decisive factor in evaluating such deed is the intention of the parties as shown by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties before, during and after the execution of said deed, and generally all pertinent facts having a tendency to determine the real nature of their design and understanding.[48] As such, documentary and parol evidence may be adduced by the parties. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy.[49] | |||||
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2005-04-26 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Second. The respondent was in dire need of money to pay her share of the downpayment for the property, including the monthly amortizations to the PHHC. She then had to borrow money from the petitioners, until she was indebted to the latter in the amount of P5,000.00. In the process, the respondent executed the Agreement/Kasunduan, Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale, all drafted by the petitioners. The nature, consequences and legal effects of the deeds were not explained to the respondent. As testified to by Notary Public Evelyn Respicio, she merely asked the respondent if the latter knew the contents of the deed of absolute sale, and the respondent purportedly replied in the affirmative. The notary public never even bothered to explain to the respondent the nature and the rights and obligations of the parties under the deed, as mandated by Article 1332 of the New Civil Code which reads: When one of the parties is unable to read, and if the contract is in a language not understood by him and mistake and fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.[40] | |||||
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2005-02-11 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| There is no single conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.[32] However, the law enumerates several instances that show when a contract is presumed to be an equitable mortgage, as follows:Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: | |||||
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2005-01-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| This Court has ruled that there is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed purporting to be an absolute sale on its face is in reality a loan secured by a mortgage.[14] Thus: The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at that time, the attitude, acts, | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Decisive for the proper determination of the true nature of the transaction between the parties is the intent of the parties. There is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage.[16] To determine whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage in reality, the court is not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. This is so because the decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situations of the parties at that time; the attitudes, acts, conduct, and declarations of the parties; the negotiations between them leading to the deed; and generally, all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties.[17] | |||||
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2003-09-26 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Moreover, issuance of orders of default should be the exception, rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[5] Here, the record is bereft of any evidence which would show that petitioner's failure to answer was due to an apparent scheme to delay the proceedings or to flagrantly transgress the rules. While petitioner's reliance on the judge's remarks during the hearing for the preliminary mandatory injunction may be misplaced, however, there is no showing of any taint of stubbornness and bad faith on his part. | |||||
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2001-11-20 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It is true that the caption of the Amended Complaint includes ejectment in the description of the nature of the suit. However, it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action.[10] A close perusal of the Amended Complaint filed before the court a quo indubitably shows that petitioners, as plaintiffs therein, prayed for the cancellation of the certificate of title in the name of Marcelo Andres, and that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.[11] | |||||