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GR No. 180440

2012-12-05

DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS

PEREZ, J.

Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply because the judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge who penned the decision. This fact alone does not diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of the trial court.[65] Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."[66] In this case, there was none.

GR No. 169641

2009-09-10

PEOPLE v. RICHARD O. SARCIA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants' defense of denial and alibi.[29] The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion: ...True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA's] parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true.

GR NO. 172184

2007-07-10

NESTOR B. DECASA v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

It is not unusual for a judge who did not wholly try a case to decide it on the basis of the records on hand after the trial judge who had heard almost entirely the testimony of the witnesses died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth. Relative thereto, we have held in several cases that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous.[33] Even though the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.[34] It may be true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision.[35] The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.[36] That a judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.[37]

GR No. 150735

2004-03-15

PEOPLE v. STEPHEN CADLEY Y CIANO

CARPIO MORALES, J.

credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.[18] Appellant goes on to call the buy-bust operation a fabrication in light of the lack of surveillance conducted on him, the admission of the prosecution that no buy-bust money was involved or used in the operation, and his immediate arrest after his alleged production of only

GR No. 142505

2003-12-11

PEOPLE v. EDUARDO FELIPE

PANGANIBAN, J.

Second, in the light of the positive identification of appellants as participants in the perpetration of the crime, their denial and alibi cannot be sustained.[37] Well-settled is the rule that such positive identification, when categorical and consistent, prevails over these twin defenses.[38] Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, they are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[39]

GR Nos. 148424-27

2003-12-11

PEOPLE v. DANILO CARAANG

PANGANIBAN, J.

Needless to say, the straightforward, clear and positive testimony of the victims -- coupled with the absence of any motive to fabricate evidence or to falsely implicate appellant -- may be enough to convict him.[36] Neither can his denial and alibi be sustained in the light of their positive identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime.[37] When categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, it prevails over such defenses[38] which -- unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof -- are deemed negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[39]

GR Nos. 145452-53

2003-06-10

PEOPLE v. LARRY CARITATIVO

CORONA, J.

Thus, even if the appellant was really on the dance floor as he claimed, this was not per se proof that he did not commit the crime, considering its proximity to the scene of the crime. It is a well-settled rule that, in order to properly appreciate the defense of alibi, the twin requirements of time and place must be strictly met.[75] The accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[76] Hence, we find no physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it happened. Thus, appellant's lame defense of alibi is not enough to overturn the convincing evidence of the prosecution proving his guilt.

GR No. 112459

2003-03-28

PEOPLE v. PAULINO BUAYABAN

CORONA, J.

The contention of the appellant has no merit. The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses. Though ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the predecessor judge has retired, died or has been reassigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. The judge who did not hear the testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial.[21] Such dependence does not violate substantive and procedural due process.[22] Indeed, the correctness of a decision is not impaired by the fact alone that the writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of factual findings reached by him.[23] The only reason for disregarding the findings of fact of the trial court (which are ordinarily given great respect by the appellate courts) is when there is a manifest indication that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the accused.[24] In this case, no such reason exists for us to set aside the trial court's findings of fact.

GR No. 112459

2003-03-28

PEOPLE v. PAULINO BUAYABAN

CORONA, J.

The contention of the appellant has no merit. The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses. Though ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the predecessor judge has retired, died or has been reassigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. The judge who did not hear the testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial.[21] Such dependence does not violate substantive and procedural due process.[22] Indeed, the correctness of a decision is not impaired by the fact alone that the writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of factual findings reached by him.[23] The only reason for disregarding the findings of fact of the trial court (which are ordinarily given great respect by the appellate courts) is when there is a manifest indication that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the accused.[24] In this case, no such reason exists for us to set aside the trial court's findings of fact.

GR No. 112459

2003-03-28

PEOPLE v. PAULINO BUAYABAN

CORONA, J.

To properly appreciate the defense of alibi, the requirements of place and time must be strictly met.[41] The accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[42] Here, we find no physical impossibility for the appellant to have been at the place of the commission of the crime and to have actually participated in it.

	GR No. 180440 2012-12-05	DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS PEREZ, J.
Also, this Court will not review the factual findings of the trial court simply because the judge who heard and tried the case was not the same judge who penned the decision. This fact alone does not diminish the veracity and correctness of the factual findings of the trial court.[65] Indeed, "the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."[66] In this case, there was none.
	GR No. 169641 2009-09-10	PEOPLE v. RICHARD O. SARCIA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants' defense of denial and alibi.[29] The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion: ...True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA's] parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true.
	GR NO. 172184 2007-07-10	NESTOR B. DECASA v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is not unusual for a judge who did not wholly try a case to decide it on the basis of the records on hand after the trial judge who had heard almost entirely the testimony of the witnesses died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth. Relative thereto, we have held in several cases that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous.[33] Even though the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.[34] It may be true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision.[35] The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.[36] That a judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.[37]
	GR No. 150735 2004-03-15	PEOPLE v. STEPHEN CADLEY Y CIANO CARPIO MORALES, J.
credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.[18] Appellant goes on to call the buy-bust operation a fabrication in light of the lack of surveillance conducted on him, the admission of the prosecution that no buy-bust money was involved or used in the operation, and his immediate arrest after his alleged production of only
	GR No. 142505 2003-12-11	PEOPLE v. EDUARDO FELIPE PANGANIBAN, J.
Second, in the light of the positive identification of appellants as participants in the perpetration of the crime, their denial and alibi cannot be sustained.[37] Well-settled is the rule that such positive identification, when categorical and consistent, prevails over these twin defenses.[38] Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, they are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[39]
	GR Nos. 148424-27 2003-12-11	PEOPLE v. DANILO CARAANG PANGANIBAN, J.
Needless to say, the straightforward, clear and positive testimony of the victims -- coupled with the absence of any motive to fabricate evidence or to falsely implicate appellant -- may be enough to convict him.[36] Neither can his denial and alibi be sustained in the light of their positive identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime.[37] When categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, it prevails over such defenses[38] which -- unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof -- are deemed negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.[39]
	GR Nos. 145452-53 2003-06-10	PEOPLE v. LARRY CARITATIVO CORONA, J.
Thus, even if the appellant was really on the dance floor as he claimed, this was not per se proof that he did not commit the crime, considering its proximity to the scene of the crime. It is a well-settled rule that, in order to properly appreciate the defense of alibi, the twin requirements of time and place must be strictly met.[75] The accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[76] Hence, we find no physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime at the time it happened. Thus, appellant's lame defense of alibi is not enough to overturn the convincing evidence of the prosecution proving his guilt.
	GR No. 112459 2003-03-28	PEOPLE v. PAULINO BUAYABAN CORONA, J.
The contention of the appellant has no merit. The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses. Though ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the predecessor judge has retired, died or has been reassigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. The judge who did not hear the testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial.[21] Such dependence does not violate substantive and procedural due process.[22] Indeed, the correctness of a decision is not impaired by the fact alone that the writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of factual findings reached by him.[23] The only reason for disregarding the findings of fact of the trial court (which are ordinarily given great respect by the appellate courts) is when there is a manifest indication that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the accused.[24] In this case, no such reason exists for us to set aside the trial court's findings of fact.
	GR No. 112459 2003-03-28	PEOPLE v. PAULINO BUAYABAN CORONA, J.
The contention of the appellant has no merit. The fact that the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses was not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses. Though ideally a judge should hear all the testimonies personally, at times the reality is that a different judge might pen the decision because the predecessor judge has retired, died or has been reassigned. In this situation, it cannot be assumed that the findings of fact of the judge who took over the case are not reliable and do not deserve the respect of the appellate courts. The judge who did not hear the testimonies personally can always rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial.[21] Such dependence does not violate substantive and procedural due process.[22] Indeed, the correctness of a decision is not impaired by the fact alone that the writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of factual findings reached by him.[23] The only reason for disregarding the findings of fact of the trial court (which are ordinarily given great respect by the appellate courts) is when there is a manifest indication that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the accused.[24] In this case, no such reason exists for us to set aside the trial court's findings of fact.
	GR No. 112459 2003-03-28	PEOPLE v. PAULINO BUAYABAN CORONA, J.
To properly appreciate the defense of alibi, the requirements of place and time must be strictly met.[41] The accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[42] Here, we find no physical impossibility for the appellant to have been at the place of the commission of the crime and to have actually participated in it.

PEOPLE v. ROGELIO SANSAET Y SANTOJALA