This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2011-07-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| While the ponencia claims that the application of the doctrine of operative facts to executive issuances is well-settled in our jurisprudence, the ponente relies on only two cases to support this claim City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, [264] and Chavez v. National Housing Authority, R-II Builders, Inc., et al. [265] In both instances, clear considerations of equity were present. | |||||
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2010-03-13 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Being the central agency mandated to "prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws," the CSC has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves.[37] The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[38] | |||||
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2009-08-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It is settled that a government official or employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose reinstatement was later ordered is considered as not having left his office, so he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.[40] Thus, Gungon is entitled to payment of back salaries equivalent to a maximum period of five years.[41] | |||||
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2007-08-15 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co.[91] (Emphasis supplied.) This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil Service Commission, wherein we ruled that: Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's order of suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.[92] (Emphasis supplied.) The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of the Philippines, thus: In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. x x x It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects "with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. In the May 6, 2003 Resolution in Chavez v. PEA,[93] we ruled that De Agbayani[94] is not applicable to the case considering that the prevailing law did not authorize private corporations from owning land. The prevailing law at the time was the 1935 Constitution as no statute dealt with the same issue. | |||||
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2005-08-25 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Magtoto v. NLRC[19] and City Government of Makati City v. Civil Service Commission[20] as precedents. It declared that it was not Javier's intention to abandon his job; his incarceration reasonably justified his failure to report for work and negated the theory that he was on AWOL. Likewise, the CA held that Javier could not be terminated on the ground of commission of a crime, as when he was acquitted of the rape charges, the second ground relied upon by the SEMC ceased to have factual basis. Hence, despite the fact that Javier was allegedly afforded the opportunity to explain his side, the same was unnecessary since, in the first place, there was no just or authorized cause for the dismissal. | |||||
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2004-09-22 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Verily, by denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the wrong ground that it is pro forma and by declaring her as in default and allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte, the trial court deprived petitioner of her right to due process, i.e., the fundamental rule that a person be accorded an opportunity to be heard.[13] To allow a trial to proceed against petitioner who could not present her defenses apparently for lack of notice, is a denial of her right to be heard, our most basic understanding of due process. We stress that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling, such as the trial court's Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and its Judgment by Default. The trial court denied petitioner this opportunity. | |||||
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2004-03-03 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| AWOL means that the employee is leaving or abandoning his post without justifiable reason and without notifying his employer.[30] In this case, petitioner gravely failed to show that respondent had the least intention to go on AWOL. Otherwise, respondent would not even have bothered to file his applications for sick and vacation leave. Moreover, had respondent intended to go on AWOL, respondent would not even have protested his reassignments in the first place, and seek his reinstatement to his former workstation. Respondent's protest of his reassignments clearly contradicts petitioner's claim that respondent was on AWOL. We apply by analogy the ruling in Cariño v. Daoas[31] where we held that petitioner is "justified in not heeding her reassignment order because her basis was xxx the legal opinion of a regional office of the Civil Service Commission" that the reassignment is illegal. In that case, we ordered the reinstatement of petitioner who was dropped from the rolls for her absence without leave for more than thirty days. In this case, respondent's absence was based on his leave applications, albeit denied, and not on his deliberate refusal to heed the reassignment orders. | |||||