This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-10-08 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| This situation was later clarified by RMC No. 49-03 dated August 15, 2003 entitled "Amending Answer to Question Number 17 of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 42-2003 and Providing Additional Guidelines on Issues Relative to the Processing of Claims for Value-Added Tax (VAT) Credit/Refund." This RMC was intended as a "response to request of selected taxpayers for adoption of procedures in handling refund cases that are aligned to the statutory requirements that refund cases should be elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals before the lapse of the period prescribed by law."[9] And yet, RMC 49-03 allowed for the simultaneous processing of the administrative and judicial claims for input VAT refund/issuance of TCC by the BIR and the CTA, respectively, and NOT the dismissal of the judicial claim on the ground of prematurity.[10] | |||||
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2010-10-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Management prerogative refers "to the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of work."[12] Although management prerogative refers to "the right to regulate all aspects of employment," it cannot be understood to include the right to temporarily withhold salary/wages without the consent of the employee. To sanction such an interpretation would be contrary to Article 116 of the Labor Code, which provides: ART. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. - It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the worker's consent. | |||||
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2005-03-28 |
TINGA, J. |
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| In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion is required.[53] Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by the Supreme Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their consideration.[54] Thus, factual determinations made by the SDHO and the NAB as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are undoubtedly beyond review and conclusive upon this Court, they being triers of facts. The congruence in their conclusion forecloses any possibility of reversible error or misappreciation of facts. Such being the case, we cannot but affirm their common conclusion as petitioner failed to advance substantial and convincing evidence and arguments that will merit the reversal of prior decisions on the case. | |||||
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2004-08-31 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Furthermore, the KMG cannot invoke the previous determinations by the DOH that the SIG personnel are considered public health workers under R.A. No. 7305 to justify their entitlement to hazard pay under that law. The Court has previously held that practice, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.[52] The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors.[53] Where the law expressly limits the grant of certain benefits to a specified class of persons, such limitation must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to a previous mistake committed by public officials in granting such benefit.[54] | |||||
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2004-07-07 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| These queries have already been settled in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit.[7] Applying Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit,[8] it was held in De Jesus that Section 13 of PD 198, as amended,[9] categorically forbids the grant of bonuses and allowances other than payment of per diems. De Jesus likewise declared that LWUA Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, which grants compensation and other benefits to the members of the Board of Directors of Local Water Districts, is not in conformity with Section 13 of PD 198, as amended. Nevertheless, it was held therein that the disallowed monetary benefits received by the Board Members concerned in 1997 and 1998 need not be refunded by the recipient Board Members because they received the same before Baybay Water District was promulgated on January 23, 2002. They were therefore of the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 was valid, thus This issue was already resolved in the similar case of Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit. In Baybay Water District, the members of the board of Baybay Water District also questioned the disallowance by the COA of payment of RATA, rice allowance and excessive per diems. The Court ruled that PD 198 governs the compensation of members of the board of water districts. Thus, members of the board of water districts cannot receive allowances and benefits more than those allowed by PD 198. Construing Section 13 of PD 198, the Court declared: x x x Under S[ection] 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing "No director shall receive other compensation" than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form. Section 13 of PD 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. It expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diems, thus preempting the exercise of any discretion by water districts in paying other allowances and bonuses. x x x x x x x x x Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala supports petitioners' position on the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several government departments and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that: Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits. This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA. Accordingly, the Court sustains the disallowance of the monetary benefits granted to petitioners Members of the Board of the BCWD in accordance with LWUA Resolution No. 313, series of 1995. Having been granted said allowances and bonuses in 1999, before the Court declared in Baybay Water District the illegality of payment of additional compensation other than the allowed per diem in Section 13, of PD 198, as amended, they can thus be considered to have received the same in good faith. Hence, they need not refund them. | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Any per diem in excess of P50 shall be subject to approval of the Administration. (Emphasis supplied) Citing the earlier case of Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit,[10] the Court ruled in De Jesus that the aforequoted provision expressly prohibits the grant of RATA, rice allowance, clothing allowance, Christmas bonus, productivity pay and honorarium to Board members of water districts, thus | |||||
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2003-11-19 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Notwithstanding the validity of the disallowance by the COA, however, the officers and employees of PITC can not be obliged to refund the SFI received by them in good faith. In the recent case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[23] it was held that the Members of the Board of the Catbalogan Water District cannot be ordered to refund the bonuses received by them because they were of the honest belief that they were authorized to approve and receive said payment. At the time they received the said benefits, the case of Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit,[24] which categorically denied the grant of additional compensation to the Members of the Board of water districts, was not yet decided. It was held that the language of Section 13 of P.D. No. 198, (the Provincial Water District Act of 1973, as amended) is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. Local Water District Utilities Administration Resolution No. 131, series of 1995, cannot justify the disbursement of additional allowances because Section 13 of P.D. No. 198, expressly prohibits the members of the board of water districts from receiving compensation other than payment of per diem. | |||||
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2003-06-10 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| This issue was already resolved in the similar case of Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit.[16] In Baybay Water District, the members of the board of Baybay Water District also questioned the disallowance by the COA of payment of RATA, rice allowance and excessive per diems. The Court ruled that PD 198 governs the compensation of members of the board of water districts. Thus, members of the board of water districts cannot receive allowances and benefits more than those allowed by PD 198. Construing Section 13 of PD 198, the Court declared:xxx Under S 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing "No director shall receive other compensation" than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form. Section 13 of PD 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. It expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diems, thus preempting the exercise of any discretion by water districts in paying other allowances and bonuses.[17] | |||||