Lawyerly

GR No. 211497

2015-03-18

HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. ANTONIO M. FARRALES

REYES, J.

The Court has always taken care, therefore, that the employer does not invoke any baseless justification, much less management prerogative, as a subterfuge by which to rid himself of an undesirable worker,[28] and thus in exceptional cases the Court has never hesitated to delve into the NLRC's factual conclusions where evidence was found insufficient to support them, or too much was deduced from the bare facts submitted by the parties, or the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions, as is true in this case.[29]

GR No. 211454

2015-02-11

MAUNLAD TRANS. v. RODOLFO M. CAMORAL

REYES, J.

But the appellate court upheld the NLRC, ruling that firstly, Section 20 of POEA SEC, which is deemed written into the seafarer's contract, provides for the minimum requirements acceptable to the government before it approves the deployment of Filipino seafarers on foreign ocean-going vessels, and that secondly, the two elements required for an injury or illness to be compensable concurred in the case: a) the injury or illness is work related, and b) and it occurred during the term of the seafarer's contract.[12] The pertinent portion of Section 20 reads: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.

GR No. 190161

2014-10-13

CANUEL v. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The terms and conditions of a seafarer's employment are governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring. Deemed integrated in his employment contract is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented by the POEA, called the "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels," which provisions are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.[40]

GR No. 209302

2014-07-09

ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE v. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT

MENDOZA, J.

In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues where there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.[34] In this case, considering the conflicting findings of the LA, on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, the Court is compelled to resolve the factual issues along with the legal ones, the core issue being whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability benefits on account of his medical condition.

GR No. 203472

2014-07-09

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON

BRION, J.

To support his contention, Simbajon also pointed out that his PEME results cleared him from pre-identified diseases including Diabetes mellitus. This is a point, however, that we have considered in other rulings. In Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency,[58] we noted that it is an accepted rule that PEMEs are usually not exploratory in nature. The tests conducted are not intended to be an in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. They merely determine whether the examinee is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service"; they do not describe the real state of health of an applicant.[59]

GR No. 191740

2013-02-15

SUSANA R. SY v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS

PERALTA, J.

The terms and conditions of a seafarer's employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring, and deemed integrated in his contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provisions are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.[16] The issue raised of whether petitioner is entitled to death compensation benefits from respondents is best resolved by the provisions of their Employment Contract which incorporated the 2000 Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.[17] Section 20 (A) of the Contract provides: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

GR No. 194758

2012-10-24

RUBEN D. ANDRADA v. AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY

MENDOZA, J.

In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.[17] In the case at bench, considering the conflicting findings of the LA, on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, this Court is impelled to resolve the factual issues along with the legal ones. The core issue is whether or not Andrada is entitled to disability benefits on account of his medical condition.

GR No. 197205

2012-09-26

JESSIE V. DAVID v. OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA

VELASCO JR., J.

In this case, David was diagnosed with MFH (now known as undifferentiated pleomorphic sarcoma [UPS]),[41] which is a class of soft-tissue sarcoma or an illness that account for approximately 1% of the known malignant tumors.[42] As stated by Dr. Peña of the MMC, who was consulted by the company-designated physician, the etiology of soft tissue sarcomas are multifactorial.[43] However, some factors are associated with a higher risk.[44] These factors include exposure to chemical carcinogens[45] like some of the chemical components of crude oil. Clearly, David has provided more than a reasonable nexus between the nature of his job and the disease that manifested itself on the sixth month of his last contract with respondents. It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.[46]

GR No. 191491

2011-12-14

JEBSENS MARITIME INC. v. ENRIQUE UNDAG

MENDOZA, J.

Consequently, for cardiovascular disease to constitute an occupational disease for which the seafarer may claim compensation, it is incumbent upon said seafarer to show that he developed the same under any of the three conditions identified above.[4]

GR No. 184722

2010-03-15

ALEX C. COOTAUCO v. MMS PHIL. MARITIME SERVICES

PEREZ, J.

In exceptional cases, however, we may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. The case at bar constitutes one of these exceptional cases.[24]

GR No. 182623

2009-12-04

DIONISIO M. MUSNIT v. SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION

CARPIO MORALES, J.

Section 20(B) provides for the liabilities of the employer only when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment.[34]

	GR No. 211497 2015-03-18	HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. ANTONIO M. FARRALES REYES, J.
The Court has always taken care, therefore, that the employer does not invoke any baseless justification, much less management prerogative, as a subterfuge by which to rid himself of an undesirable worker,[28] and thus in exceptional cases the Court has never hesitated to delve into the NLRC's factual conclusions where evidence was found insufficient to support them, or too much was deduced from the bare facts submitted by the parties, or the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions, as is true in this case.[29]
	GR No. 211454 2015-02-11	MAUNLAD TRANS. v. RODOLFO M. CAMORAL REYES, J.
But the appellate court upheld the NLRC, ruling that firstly, Section 20 of POEA SEC, which is deemed written into the seafarer's contract, provides for the minimum requirements acceptable to the government before it approves the deployment of Filipino seafarers on foreign ocean-going vessels, and that secondly, the two elements required for an injury or illness to be compensable concurred in the case: a) the injury or illness is work related, and b) and it occurred during the term of the seafarer's contract.[12] The pertinent portion of Section 20 reads: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.
	GR No. 190161 2014-10-13	CANUEL v. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The terms and conditions of a seafarer's employment are governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring. Deemed integrated in his employment contract is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented by the POEA, called the "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels," which provisions are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.[40]
	GR No. 209302 2014-07-09	ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE v. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT MENDOZA, J.
In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues where there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.[34] In this case, considering the conflicting findings of the LA, on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, the Court is compelled to resolve the factual issues along with the legal ones, the core issue being whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability benefits on account of his medical condition.
	GR No. 203472 2014-07-09	MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HENRY M. SIMBAJON BRION, J.
To support his contention, Simbajon also pointed out that his PEME results cleared him from pre-identified diseases including Diabetes mellitus. This is a point, however, that we have considered in other rulings. In Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency,[58] we noted that it is an accepted rule that PEMEs are usually not exploratory in nature. The tests conducted are not intended to be an in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant's medical condition. They merely determine whether the examinee is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service"; they do not describe the real state of health of an applicant.[59]
	GR No. 191740 2013-02-15	SUSANA R. SY v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS PERALTA, J.
The terms and conditions of a seafarer's employment is governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring, and deemed integrated in his contract is a set of standard provisions set and implemented by the POEA, called the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which provisions are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.[16] The issue raised of whether petitioner is entitled to death compensation benefits from respondents is best resolved by the provisions of their Employment Contract which incorporated the 2000 Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.[17] Section 20 (A) of the Contract provides: SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
	GR No. 194758 2012-10-24	RUBEN D. ANDRADA v. AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY MENDOZA, J.
In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or the court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the LA and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.[17] In the case at bench, considering the conflicting findings of the LA, on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, this Court is impelled to resolve the factual issues along with the legal ones. The core issue is whether or not Andrada is entitled to disability benefits on account of his medical condition.
	GR No. 197205 2012-09-26	JESSIE V. DAVID v. OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA VELASCO JR., J.
In this case, David was diagnosed with MFH (now known as undifferentiated pleomorphic sarcoma [UPS]),[41] which is a class of soft-tissue sarcoma or an illness that account for approximately 1% of the known malignant tumors.[42] As stated by Dr. Peña of the MMC, who was consulted by the company-designated physician, the etiology of soft tissue sarcomas are multifactorial.[43] However, some factors are associated with a higher risk.[44] These factors include exposure to chemical carcinogens[45] like some of the chemical components of crude oil. Clearly, David has provided more than a reasonable nexus between the nature of his job and the disease that manifested itself on the sixth month of his last contract with respondents. It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.[46]
	GR No. 191491 2011-12-14	JEBSENS MARITIME INC. v. ENRIQUE UNDAG MENDOZA, J.
Consequently, for cardiovascular disease to constitute an occupational disease for which the seafarer may claim compensation, it is incumbent upon said seafarer to show that he developed the same under any of the three conditions identified above.[4]
	GR No. 184722 2010-03-15	ALEX C. COOTAUCO v. MMS PHIL. MARITIME SERVICES PEREZ, J.
In exceptional cases, however, we may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties or, where the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions. The case at bar constitutes one of these exceptional cases.[24]
	GR No. 182623 2009-12-04	DIONISIO M. MUSNIT v. SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES, J.
Section 20(B) provides for the liabilities of the employer only when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment.[34]

CARLOS N. NISDA v. SEA SERVE MARITIME AGENCY