This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2015-08-17 |
SERENO, C.J. |
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| Indeed, the RTC is allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa against Ang notwithstanding the executive determination of probable cause by the prosecutor. If we were to construe otherwise, we would be contradicting the basic principle that "once an information is filed in RTC, any disposition of the case rests already in the sound discretion of the court."[38] | |||||
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2012-03-20 |
ABAD, J. |
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| [45] Viudez II v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152889, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 345, 357. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| We are not unmindful of the settled jurisprudence that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.[11] Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that this settled jurisprudence does not apply in this case. The trial court's knowledge that the filing of the amended informations was done by the public prosecutor in excess of his delegated authority no longer gives him the discretion as to whether or not accept the amended informations. The only option the trial court had was not to admit the amended informations as a sign of deference and respect to the COMELEC, which already had taken cognizance of respondent's appeal. This, the trial court did not choose. It insisted on admitting the amended informations, which were patent nullities for being filed contrary to the directives of the COMELEC. Necessarily, all actions and rulings of the trial court arising from these amended informations must likewise be invalid and of no effect. | |||||