This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-01-21 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.[41] Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.[42] | |||||
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2014-11-12 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.[26] Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the petitioner's car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified: Q: On that particular date, time and place ... what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused (sic) the charged in for Viol, of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136? A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoy namin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo. Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the accused swerving, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: Is that also the reason why you apprehended him? A: Yes, sir. Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused? A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?" x x x x Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness? A: He refused to ride with us going to the hospital, Your Honor. x x x x[27] | |||||
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2014-07-30 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused.[24] Quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.[25] This is precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his seemingly indifference to the deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of precaution which eventually led to JR's death. | |||||
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2012-11-26 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.[22] In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.[23] Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.[24] | |||||
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2011-07-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen.[21] Thus, in order for conviction to be decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damage suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the accused, and the direct link between material damage and failure in precaution must be established beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally convinced that all three were established in this case in accordance with the required level of evidence in criminal cases. | |||||
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2011-03-16 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136.[8] Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour, while the records show that he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Under the New Civil Code,[9] unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered[10] which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.[11][ ]To suggest that De los Santos was equally negligent based on that sole statement of the RTC is erroneous. The entire evidence presented must be considered as a whole. Incidentally, a close reading of the ruling of the CA would clearly show the negligence of Mejia. A portion of the decision reads: A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a reckless speed that it collided with the car bearing the deceased. The impact was such that the bus landed astride the car, dragged the car across the right lane of White Plains Road, across the concrete island/flower box in the center of White Plains Road, destroying the lamp post in the island until both vehicles landed by the petitioner fence of Camp Aguinaldo. | |||||