This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2015-09-02 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It must be pointed out right off that the petitioner would have this Court review the uniform factual findings of the courts below, an exercise which necessarily entails evaluating the credence accorded by them on AAA's account of her sordid experience in the hands of petitioner. It is a hornbook rule, however, that factual determinations of trial courts when substantiated by evidence on record carry great weight and respect on appeal. It is not the function of this Court in a petition for review to evaluate evidence all over again,[20] save in exceptional circumstances, such as where the findings of the trial court and the CA are absurd, contrary to the evidence on record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation of facts.[21] The extant case does not fall under the exceptions to this general rule. It is germane to state, however, that the Court has assumed an attitude of caution and circumspection in evaluating testimonies in rape cases, bearing in mind the familiar dictum that an accusation for rape can be made with facility, albeit difficult to prove, but more difficult for the accused to disprove, though innocent. | |||||
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2011-09-12 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the prosecution of the case. The Court's ruling in Tan v. People[23] is quite instructive, to wit: An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. | |||||
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2010-12-14 |
ABAD, J. |
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| In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter's daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria's house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria's grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.[31] In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs' hospitality when she was in the Philippines.[32] | |||||
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2010-12-08 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone."[45] To borrow the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a criminal case pending with the trial court was sought: [T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.[46] | |||||
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2010-11-17 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2), Article III[12] of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.[13] | |||||
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2010-11-17 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order[71] and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days,[72] Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[73] Viewed in the context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sia's subsequent transfer to another government office, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial. | |||||
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2010-07-26 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| On a final note, this Court is aware of this Court's Third Division Decision dated April 21, 2009 entitled Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines[50] wherein respondent argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the prosecution. This Court denied the petition and ruled for the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. It must be pointed out that said decision involves Criminal Case No. 119830,[51] which is distinct and separate from Criminal Case No. 119831 and Criminal Case No. 119832 which are the subject matter of herein petition. Thus, the resolution of the case at bar is without prejudice to the proceedings that are being conducted in Criminal Case No. 119830 at whatever stage it may be. | |||||