This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-02-27 |
SERENO, J. |
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| Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts.[30] For abandonment to be appreciated, there must be a "clear, willful, deliberate, and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume employment."[31] Here, the mere fact that Oco asked for separation pay, after she was told to no longer report for work, does not reflect her intention to leave her job. She is merely exercising her option under Article 279 of the Labor Code, which entitles her to either reinstatement and back wages or payment of separation pay. | |||||
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2011-11-28 |
REYES, J. |
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| Constructive dismissal 'occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.[43] | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Being a matter of intention, moreover, abandonment cannot be inferred or presumed from equivocal acts.[26] As a just and valid ground for dismissal, it requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment,[27] without any intention of returning.[28] Two elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.[29] The burden of proving abandonment is once again upon the employer[30] who, whether pleading the same as a ground for dismissing an employee or as a mere defense, additionally has the legal duty to observe due process.[31] Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to report to work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.[32] | |||||
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2011-01-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| As to the second issue, constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option but to quit.[29] | |||||
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2010-06-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| On the issue of whether PGI was indeed entitled to the payment of services it rendered, the Court sees no imperative to re-examine the congruent findings of the trial and appellate courts thereon. Undoubtedly, the exercise involves an examination of facts which is normally beyond the ambit of the Court's functions under a petition for review, for it is well-settled that this Court is not a trier of facts. While this judicial tenet admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of facts of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court's, or when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or when the findings of facts are contradicted by the evidence on record,[15] these extenuating grounds find no application in the present petitions. | |||||
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2009-12-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation of work because continued employment has been rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.[14] | |||||
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2009-09-18 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| While it is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, re-examine the evidence presented by the parties to a case, there are a number of recognized exceptions, such as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of facts of lower courts are conflicting; or when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but which are contradicted by the evidence on record.[8] | |||||