This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-03-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| When confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther with the trial. While the Secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.[20] When the trial court's Order rests entirely on the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own independent evaluation, the trial court effectively abdicates its judicial power and refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. | |||||
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2014-01-13 |
BRION, J. |
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| We also find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica's argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge"[9] when she insisted that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a prosecutor's recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor's action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor. The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay[10] best explains why we so rule: To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion. | |||||
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2010-12-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| We disagree with petitioners. As mentioned earlier, the matter of deciding who to prosecute is a prerogative of the prosecutor. In Hipos v. Judge Bay,[14] we held that the remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. The only time the discretion of the prosecutor will stand review by mandamus is when the prosecutor gravely abuses his discretion.[15] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of the decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order and becomes the subject of execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or conclusions of the court ordering nothing.[18] However, where one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.[19] Thus, in Spouses Rebuldea v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[20] the Court held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it corrected the dispositive portion of its decision to make it conform to the body of the decision, and to rectify the clerical errors which interchanged the mortgagors and the mortgagee. | |||||