This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-11-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The Court discredits appellant's defense of denial for it is a negative and self-serving evidence,[21] which pales in comparison to the victim's clear and convincing narration and positive identification of her assailant. The Court, likewise, does not find merit in appellant's rather belated assertion that the prosecution failed to establish force or intimidation and the resistance of the victim to the intrusion. The presence of intimidation, which is purely subjective, cannot be tested by any hard and fast rule, but should be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the rape.[22] Not all victims react in the same way--some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion.[23] Here, the records show that the victim was coerced into submission by her fear that appellant would harm her family. In any event, established during the trial were that appellant was the live-in partner of the victim's mother, and that he was the one taking care of the children while the mother worked in Makati City.[24] The moral ascendancy and influence of appellant, a father figure to the victim, can take the place of threat or intimidation.[25] | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi in this case are not worthy of belief, given that he failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time and place of the crime.[26] Established is the rule that denial and alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[27] | |||||
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2009-01-19 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[37] The appellant had not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time and place of the crime.[38] | |||||
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2008-06-18 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The essence of treachery lies in the attack which comes without warning, and is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape,[50] ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[51] What is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.[52] Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.[53] | |||||
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2007-09-03 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| We likewise accord credibility to Evelyn when she identified appellant to be her father's assailant. Be it remembered that at the time appellant attacked the father, Evelyn had already positively identified him as the knife wielder in her bedroom and her attacker in the living room. From the steady stream of events that unfolded interminably from the time she was roused from her sleep up to the time appellant began attacking her father, Evelyn was the object of appellant's ire, so much so that when the father saw his hapless daughter in the grip of a knife-wielding intruder, the father exclaimed: "Randy, bakit mo ginaganyan ang anak ko." And as appellant charged upon the father, it was but in accord with human nature for daughter Evelyn to try to remain conscious to be able to come to the aid of her father in any manner she could, even just to identify his attacker. Indeed, Evelyn's identification of appellant draws strength from the rule that family members who have witnessed the killing of their loved ones usually strive, at the very least, to remember the faces of the assailants.[19] A relative will naturally be | |||||
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2004-05-28 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Finally, on appellant's civil liability, this Court finds it appropriate to impose additional damages in line with prevailing doctrine: exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000,[43] moral damages in the amount of P50,000,[44] and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 for funeral expenses.[45] The P50,000 indemnity fixed by the Court of Appeals should be sustained. | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Finally, on the matter of appellant's civil liability, prevailing jurisprudence dictates the imposition of moral damages in the amount of P50,000[43] and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.[44] The P50,000 indemnity fixed by the court a quo is sustained. | |||||
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2004-04-14 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Further, it bears stressing that appellant gave no proof of ill-motive for Almodovar to testify falsely against him. Appellant himself admitted in court that he met the witness for the first time only during the investigation.[21] Absent any ill-motive, this Court can only conclude that his act in imputing the responsibility for the crime on appellant stemmed from a legitimate desire to bring the perpetrator to justice.[22] As held in numerous decisions, when there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution is moved by improper motives, such witness is entitled to full faith and credit.[23] | |||||