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EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE v. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 166357 2015-01-14	VALERIO E. KALAW v. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ BERSAMIN, J.
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner's testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."[18]
	GR No. 167459 2011-01-26	JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA v. BONA J. ALANO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to wit: In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[13]
	GR No. 184063 2011-01-24	CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC NACHURA, J.
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43]
	GR No. 173138 2010-12-01	NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.[24] Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
	GR No. 173138 2010-12-01	NOEL B. BACCAY v. MARIBEL C. BACCAY VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without any provocation.[10]
	GR No. 164493 2010-03-10	JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO BRION, J.
All cases - involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code - that came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
	GR No. 166579 2010-02-18	JORDAN CHAN PAZ v. JEANICE PAVON PAZ CARPIO, J.
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[22]
	GR No. 180668 2009-05-26	MARIETA C. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.[14] Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[15] With the advent of Te v. Te,[16] the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.
	GR No. 166562 2009-03-31	BENJAMIN G. TING v. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING NACHURA, J.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.[57]