This case has been cited 17 times or more.
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2012-06-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[151] | |||||
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2011-07-27 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture on the matter, i.e., that the attack was preceded by a fight between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be persuaded by the accused-appellant's version of the events in question. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the testimony of children of sound mind is "more correct and truthful than that of older persons" and that "children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons."[55] In the instant case, Carmela was cross-examined by the defense counsel but she remained steadfast and consistent in her statements. Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to distrust the testimony of Carmela. | |||||
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2011-04-04 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, naturally found the existence of conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[26] Verily, when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony.[27] Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[28] Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result.[29] Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.[30] As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,[31] "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." | |||||
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2010-07-05 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The deprivation required by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.[30] In this case, although Nikko was free to move around, he was at all times under the alternate watch of appellants and their cohorts. He was in their physical custody and complete control as he was kept in places strange and unfamiliar to him. While he was allowed to play in the houses where he was kept, the fact remains that he was under the control of his captors who left him there, as he could not leave the house until they shall have returned for him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty. | |||||
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2010-06-29 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267[33] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.[34] The prosecution established all these elements. Consider the following testimony of the victim: Q You said that you were kidnapped on October 18, 1997, up to when were you kidnapped? A Up to November 6, 1997. [Q] How long was that? [A] Nineteen days. Q During the duration of your detention, in that house, were you able to use the telephone? A Yes, sir. Q How many times? A Three. x x x x Q Whom are you talking to during those three times or three occasions that you used the telephone? A I was calling my husband. Q What did you talk about with your husband during those occasions? A About the ransom money to be given. Q How many [sic] ransom money were they initially asking? A Thirty Million. x x x [Q] You said that you were able to talk to any of the ten people while you were in captivity? A Yes, sir. Q Did this include Daisy Balaan? A Yes, sir. Q What did Daisy Balaan tell you? A She told me that I will be "bibitayin" or to be hanged. Q Why did she tell you this? A Because I have the intention to escape. x x x x COURT: Were you blindfolded or tied? A No, sir. Atty. Chua: You said that you were detained for nineteen days and you were released sometime on November 6, 1997, can you tell the Court how you were released? A After our family gave the ransom money. Q How much ransom was paid by your family? A P500,000.00. x x x x[35] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) | |||||
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2007-07-12 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267[52] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 7659 warranting the imposition of the death penalty, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.[53] Neither actual demand for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that the deprivation of liberty was for extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration.[54] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There is a want of evidence to show the concerted acts of the appellant and his co-accused in pursuing a common design - to kill the deceased, Piamonte. The sole eyewitness for the prosecution, Garcia, was categorical and precise in declaring that he did not see the act of stabbing Piamonte, nor the manner in which Piamonte was stabbed. He later learned that Piamonte died from stab wounds when he saw the latter's dead body covered with stab wounds. The cause of death of Piamonte, as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals,[78] and as borne by the records, is multiple stab wounds.[79] It was, thus, incumbent on the part of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant and his co-accused acted in concert with a unity of purpose to kill Piamonte. They must show to the satisfaction of this Court the appellant's overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[80] They must show that appellant's act of striking Piamonte with a pipe was an intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[81] | |||||
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2004-07-05 |
PER CURIAM |
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| 'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of persons agree to commit, and enter upon the commission of the crime which will probably endanger human life such as robbery, all of them are responsible for the death of a person that ensues as a consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law. ed. 1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in a criminal attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when he tries to escape, pursue him with increased numbers, and continue the assault, are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of the them during the beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C., 239)" Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein was directed against the other members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the deceased, this would not relieve them from the consequence of the acts jointly done by another member of the petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro.[79] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,[80] this Court held: Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife Aileen was also sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape accountability for the tragic consequences of their actions. | |||||
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2004-05-28 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| In People vs. Bisda,[23] we held that:Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more person agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. In People vs. Pagalasan, this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Fifth, the motive attributed by the trial court to appellant in throwing a pillbox at Russel is based not on the testimony of prosecution witness Russel but on the testimony of appellant. It is a hornbook doctrine that the prosecution must rely on its own evidence to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt[33] and therefore, the trial court should not depend on the evidence of the defense to support the conviction of appellant. However, considering that the presiding judge had given probative weight or credibility to the testimony of appellant by using his testimony to establish motive on his part to commit the crime, the same testimony may be used likewise to prove that witness Russel had an ill-motive to testify against appellant. And when the evidence admits of two interpretations, that which is favorable to appellant should prevail.[34] | |||||
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2004-04-14 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| However, to merit approbation, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the perpetrator of the crime.[68] A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[69] As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence.[70] | |||||
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2004-03-16 |
PER CURIAM |
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| took him captive in Valenzuela. The victim suffered mental, physical and psychological trauma. Under the circumstances, there is sufficient basis for an award of moral damages in the amount of P300,000.[19] We also note that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages within the meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[20] This requisite has been met in this case. A band of five men, using | |||||
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2004-02-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[146] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[148] As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime. | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code[17] are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.[18] | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
PER CURIAM |
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| To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[20] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[21] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[22] The following acts of appellants Cañada and Pabillare lead us to conclude that they conspired to commit the crime: (a) Cañada who was driving the car suddenly chased and overtook the motorcycle driven by the victim causing him to fall; (b) at such unsuspecting state, Pabillare and Johnny forcibly took and dragged him inside the car; (c) Pabillare and Johnny beat the victim and compelled him to produce money for his release; (d) Cañada never showed any opposition to such acts, instead he obeyed every instruction of Pabillare and Johnny; (e) while Johnny was negotiating for the ransom money, Cañada was left with the victim, closely guarding him; (f) Cañada brought the victim to the place where the pay-off would take place; and (g) Pabillare took the ransom money. | |||||
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2003-10-23 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. In People of the Philippines vs. Alma Bisda and Generosa Basilan,[8] this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[9] | |||||
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2003-10-13 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Fiscal Cabalum: I would like to present the testimony of this witness being an eyewitness to the killing of the victim SPO1 Alfredo DAn Cocjin by the accused sometime on January 4, 1992, at Brgy. Zona Sur, Banate, Iloilo.[26] The appellant did not object to Job's testimony when the public prosecutor offered it. Instead, the appellant cross-examined the witness The appellant did not protest when the prosecutor faultily offered its documentary and physical evidence and rested its case. The appellant even offered testimonial evidence to controvert Job's testimony. It is now too late in the day for the appellant to assail, for the first time in this Court, the public prosecutor's failure to offer the testimony of a witness before direct examination.[27] | |||||