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CIR v. MICHEL J. LHUILLIER PAWNSHOP

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR NO. 149834 2006-05-02	CIR v. TRUSTWORTHY PAWNSHOP SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michael J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,[6] we were confronted with a similar issue: "Are pawnshops included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage tax under then Section 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended by Executive Order No. 273?" We answered the question in the negative, holding that while pawnshops are indeed engaged in the business of lending money, they cannot be deemed "lending investors" for the purpose of imposing the 5% lending investor's tax. Such ruling is anchored on the following reasons:First. Under Section 192, paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs (dd) and (ff) of the NIRC of 1997, prior to its amendment by E.O. No. 273, as well as Section 161, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs (dd) and (ff) of the NIRC of 1986, pawnshops and lending investors were subjected to different tax treatments, thus:
	GR NO. 156047 2005-04-12	ENGR. PEDRO C. RUBIO v. EMMANUEL M. PARAS CALLEJO, SR., J.
... Under the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.[23]
	GR NO. 141658 2005-03-18	CIR v. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY CARPIO, J.
Petitioner's argument is likewise not in accord with existing jurisprudence. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,[31] the Court ruled that the different tax treatment accorded to pawnshops and lending investors in the NIRC of 1977 and the NIRC of 1986 showed "the intent of Congress to deal with both subjects differently." The same reasoning applies squarely to the present case.
	GR No. 127624 2003-11-18	BPI LEASING CORPORATION v. CA AZCUNA, J.
The doctrine enunciated in Fortune Tobacco, and reiterated in CIR v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,[18] is that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law. In Lhuillier and Fortune Tobacco, the Court invalidated the revenue memoranda concerned because the same increased the tax liabilities of the affected taxpayers without affording them due process. In this case, Revenue Regulation 19-86 would be beneficial to the taxpayers as they are subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is invoking Revenue Regulation 19-86 as the very basis of its claim for refund. If it were invalid, then petitioner all the more has no right to a refund.