This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2009-02-13 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Indeed, the debtor's right to apply payment has been considered merely directory, and not mandatory,[21] following this Court's earlier pronouncement that "the ordinary acceptation of the terms `may' and `shall' may be resorted to as guides in ascertaining the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions."[22] | |||||
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2006-07-31 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Indeed, an employee's disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.[30] The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow from the primary injury are compensable.[31] | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| While Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "when an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number," however, this rule is only permissive, not mandatory. We have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto,[14] which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of law and fact. | |||||
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2005-10-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In accordance with Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the investigating prosecutor shall prepare the resolution and information if he finds cause to hold the respondent for trial. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complaint and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the call of the investigating prosecutor, in the exercise of his sound discretion, whether to conduct a clarificatory hearing or not. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the term "may" under Subsection (e) of Section 3 of Rule 112 is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the investigating prosecutor to conduct a clarificatory hearing or not.[8] If he believes that the evidence before him is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, he may not hold a clarificatory hearing. As held in Webb v. De Leon:[9] | |||||