This case has been cited 13 times or more.
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2015-08-12 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[76] the Court restated the reasons which may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (t) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. | |||||
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2014-11-19 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest in the co-ownership. However, this was not the object of the sale between him and petitioner. The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has "no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication."[86] | |||||
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2011-02-23 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| "Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby."[28] All these factors are attendant in this case. In the case of Tiangco v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[29] it was written: Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. | |||||
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2010-10-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious circumstance can be tested under the guidelines we established in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[38] as follows: Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilator y, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [Emphasis supplied.] | |||||
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2008-12-08 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The flaws in petitioner's moves/representations reinforce respondents' claim that the Motion for Extension was "cunningly" dated May 5, 2006 (the last day to file a responsive pleading) to make it appear that it was timely filed, although it was transmitted only on May 14, 2006. Petitioner's allegation that the Motion it filed was the one actually prepared and signed on May 5, 2006[17] contradicts its earlier claim in its Opposition to the Motion to Declare [It] in Default that "[s]hort of time in coming up with [herein petitioner's] Answer on April 28, 2006," its counsel caused to be prepared a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer which was, however, misplaced, and upon discovery thereof "another motion for extension was immediately caused to be prepared and filed."[18] | |||||
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2008-04-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| ii. Should this Honorable Court lend credence to the argument of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 20 April 2006 that there are issues as to material fact that require presentation of evidence , to REMAND the resolution of the legal issues raised by Private Respondent to the trial court consistent with this Honorable Court's holding in the Gingoyon Resolution that the interests of the movants-in-intervention [meaning Takenaka, Asahikosan, and herein Private Respondent] may be duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts."[62] | |||||
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2007-07-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Entrenched in jurisprudence is the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of cases. Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle for the attainment of substantial justice. Therefore, cases should be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.[13] | |||||
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2007-02-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[24] Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case. | |||||
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2006-10-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.[12] | |||||
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2006-08-07 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| This Court has held time and again that rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them.[13] Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.[14] In fact, this Court is not impervious to instances when rules of procedure must yield to the loftier demands of substantial justice and equity.[15] Citing Aguam v. Court of Appeals[16], this Court held in Barnes v. Quijano[17] that:The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[18] | |||||
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2006-01-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Ordinarily, until his dismissal or withdrawal is made of record in court, any judicial notice sent to a counsel of record is binding upon his client even though as between them the professional relationship may have been terminated.[37] However, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, Atty. Orias, Jr. was negligent in not adequately protecting petitioner's interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules. Verily, the negligence of Atty. Orias, Jr. cannot be deemed as negligence of petitioner itself in the present case. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client.[38] Thus, petitioner is deemed to have filed its petition for review on certiorari within the reglementary period as alleged in its Reply. | |||||
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2005-06-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| In the assailed decision, indeed, the Court upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japson.[10] However, we suspended this rule in order to serve substantial justice in accordance with Ginete vs. Court of Appeals[11] and Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals.[12] | |||||
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2004-10-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Nevertheless, in order to serve the ends of substantial justice and fair play, the Court deems it apt to suspend the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules on appeal in the present case. After all, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.[22] | |||||