This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2013-01-30 |
REYES, J. |
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| In Smart Communications, Inc., v. Astorga,[34] the Court held that: The nature of redundancy as an authorized cause for dismissal is explained in the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, viz: | |||||
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2012-11-21 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Given Morales' previous record of not reporting for work for one whole week without prior leave of absence while assigned as reliever in its Borongan, Samar Branch,[33] we find that Metrobank cannot be faulted for including him in the list of employees covered by the SSP. The rule is settled that "the determination that the employee's services are no longer necessary or sustainable and, therefore, properly terminable for being redundant is an exercise of business judgment of the employer."[34] "While it is true that management may not, under the guise of invoking its prerogative, ease out employees and defeat their constitutional right to security of tenure,"[35] the wisdom and soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review unless a violation of law or arbitrary or malicious action is shown.[36] Against Morales' bare assertion that he was arbitrarily and maliciously terminated from service, Metrobank was able to establish that its action was based on the fair application of a criterion established in connection with the implementation of a well-thought redundancy program. For these reasons, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for upholding the NLRC's finding that Morales' termination pursuant to the SSP was valid. | |||||
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2011-09-07 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| As for Jumuad's claim for the reimbursement of the 40% of the value of the car loan subsidized by Hi-Flyer under its car loan policy, the same must also be denied. The rights and obligations of the parties to a car loan agreement is not a proper issue in a labor dispute but in a civil one.[42] It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.[43] Jurisdiction, therefore, lies with the regular courts in a separate civil action.[44] | |||||
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2011-08-03 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Considering that Leynes was terminated from service upon an authorized cause, we find that the CA likewise erred in faulting NHPI for supposedly failing to notify said employee of the particular act or omission leveled against her and the ground/s for which she was dismissed from employment. Where dismissal, however, is for an authorized cause like redundancy, the employer is, instead, required to serve a written notice of termination on the worker concerned and the DOLE, at least one month from the intended date thereof.[49] Here, NHPI specifically made Leynes' termination from service effective 22 August 2002, but only informed said employee of the same on 8 August 2002[50] and filed with the DOLE the required Establishment Termination Report only on 16 August 2002.[51] For its failure to comply strictly with the 30-day minimum requirement for said notice and effectively violating Leynes' right to due process, NHPI should be held liable to pay nominal damages in the sum of P50,000.00. The penalty should understandably be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of its management prerogative.[52] | |||||
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2009-08-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The issue on the proper computation of Mutuc's backwages has been rendered moot by our decision that Mutuc was validly dismissed. Backwages is a relief given to an illegally dismissed employee.[31] Since Mutuc's dismissal is for an authorized cause, she is not entitled to backwages. | |||||