This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-11-25 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Jurisprudence is indeed replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician's findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer.[24] It is worthy to note, however, that neither the claimant nor the labor tribunals and the courts are automatically bound by the medical report issued by the company-designated physician. The inherent merit of the said report would still have to be weighed and duly considered by the Court.[25] | |||||
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2015-06-17 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| “It is beyond cavil that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability.”[43] It is the company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer. Such assessment is arrived at after the seafarer submits himself to the company-designated physician for a post employment medical examination within three days from his repatriation. It is significant to note, however, that courts are not bound by the assessment of the company-designated physician.[44] While the company-designated physician must declare the nature of a seafarer’s disability, the former’s declaration is not conclusive and final upon the latter or the court.[45] Its inherent merit will still be weighed and duly considered. | |||||
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2014-04-07 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Definitely, the Labor Arbiter's award of loss of earning is unwarranted since Chin had already been given disability compensation for loss of earning capacity. An additional award for loss of earnings will result in double recovery. In a catena of cases,[4] the Court has consistently ruled that disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. Disability, therefore, is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness." What is compensated is one's incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity.[5] | |||||
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2013-06-26 |
BRION, J. |
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| The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez,[31] the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them." Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the company-designated physician, issued her fit-to-work certification for him. There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination. | |||||
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2012-12-05 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Even if we were to disregard the fact, however, that the POEA-SEC recognizes only the disability grading provided by the company-designated physician,[36] LISI correctly faults the CA for awarding disability benefits corresponding to the Grade 3 disability rating assessed by Dr. Mendiola. The record shows that on 5 July 2005, Dr. Mendiola issued the following medical certificate in favor of Calawigan, to wit: This is to certify that Mr. Enrique Calawigan, 46 years old, was seen and examined by the undersigned last June 26, 2005 due to hearing impairment on both ears. | |||||
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2012-10-24 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The Court notes that the dispute regarding Andrada's medical condition could have been easily clarified and resolved had the parties observed and stayed true to the procedure laid down in Section 20 (B), par. 3 of the POEA-SEC. Considering that the parties did not jointly resort to seek the opinion of a third physician in the determination and assessment of Andrada's disability or the absence of it, the credibility of the findings of their respective doctors was properly evaluated by the NLRC[21] on the basis of their inherent merits. | |||||