This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2009-06-05 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Still, Gabriel failed to accomplish the works within the agreed completion period. Eventually, on April 26, 1997, Gabriel abandoned the project. On August 8, 1997, respondent served a letter[15] upon Gabriel terminating their agreement since the latter had only completed 63.48% of the SDS project, valued at P744,965.00; and 46.60% of the STP, valued at P5,171,032.48. Respondent thereafter demanded from Gabriel the return of the balance of the advance payment. Respondent, likewise, demanded the payment of the additional amount that it incurred in completing the project.[16] Finally, respondent made formal demands against petitioner and Tico to make good their obligations under their respective performance and surety bonds. However, all of them failed to heed respondent's demand. Hence, respondent filed a complaint[17] against petitioner, Tico, and Gabriel, before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| On February 5, 1999, the parties signed the Terms of Reference[21] (TOR) wherein their admission of facts, their respective positions and claims, the issues to be determined, and the amount of arbitration fees were summarized and set forth. | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| SO ORDERED.[25] | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission has jurisdiction over the instant case by virtue of Section 12.10 (Arbitration Clause) of the Subcontract Agreement.[29] | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The impending expiration of the first and third bonds prompted respondent to require Gabriel to arrange for their (the bonds) immediate revalidation. Thus, in a letter dated February 21, 1997, respondent asked that the performance bond for the SDS phase be extended until May 31, 1998; and for the surety bond, until June 30, 1997.[41] Contrary to petitioner's contention, this should not be construed as a recognition on the part of respondent that the bonds were no longer valid by reason of the modification of the subcontract agreement. There was indeed a need for the renewal of petitioner's bonds because they were about to expire, pursuant to the terms of the surety agreements. Since petitioner refused to revalidate the aforesaid bonds, Gabriel was constrained to secure the required bonds from Tico which issued, on February 25, 1997, the new performance and surety bonds (for the SDS phase) replacing those of petitioner's. The performance bond was coterminous with the final acceptance of the project, while the surety bond was to expire on February 26, 1998. | |||||
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2007-06-22 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHEN IT REFUSED TO FILE THE INFORMATION AGAINST RESPONDENT DESPITE THE PUBLICATION OF THE SUBJECT LIBELOUS NOTICE. The general rule is that the courts do not interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the specificity and adequacy of the averments in a criminal complaint.[10] The determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court is an executive function[11] which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice.[12] The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[13] Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse.[14] | |||||
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2006-10-27 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[9] The Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. | |||||
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2005-11-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Having ruled that the RTC of Makati City has jurisdiction, we find that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against respondent Judge Panganiban for allowing the formal amendment of the informations. We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[18] By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[19] | |||||
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2004-07-21 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In the case of People v. Peralta,[25] we reiterated the rule that the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,[26] we declared that: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been presented by the petitioner. | |||||